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Momentous Week

It was a momentous week that came to an end on May 24. Roosevelt and Churchill completed their work on the future grand strategy of the war. A determined effort was made to upset the entire global policy in the interest of American isolationists who evidently want (a) a soft war, (b) a war that involves minimum aid to Russia and Britain, (c) a war in which Germany has a chance of a stalemate peace. Russia dissolved the Communist International. John L. Lewis applied for admission to the AFL. Our quick victory on Attu changed the whole strategy of the war in the northern Pacific, in our favor. The OPA, which has been trying to please everybody and hurt nobody, came dangerously near, under that policy, to utter breakdown. So did the efforts of Senate and House conferees trying to write a tax bill that would please both of two irreconcilable groups.

John L. at the Door

No one should have been surprised that John L. Lewis applied for admission to the AFL on behalf of his United Mine Workers. The move had been foreshadowed long ago. Other things being equal, it would be a good idea; the fewer the national organizations of labor, the more effective they can be. In this case, however, there are good reasons for the AFL leaders to hang back. John L. Lewis represents at this moment policies of reckless personal self-aggrandizement that are dangerous to any union, or groups of unions, with which he is connected. He has managed to bring down on himself such bitter nationwide scorn that on this basis alone he will be a liability and not an asset, for years to come. There are well authenticated reports of an understanding by him with elements already inside the AFL that want to take over the organization for their own purposes, which are no more in the interest of the average trade unionist than the purposes of the American Farm Bureau Federation are in the interest of the average dirt farmer. We hope that John L. will be left cooling his heels while trade-union leaders work on a more vital front: that of bringing the AFL and the CIO under one roof.

Strikes in Wartime

In the past few days, strikes have been taking place in a number of war plants, notably in the rubber and automotive industries. Some of these have already been settled, and presumably the others soon will be. In nearly all cases these are wildcat strikes, conducted by the rank and file against the wishes of the union officials. They should serve to remind us of several things. First, even loyal and patriotic citizens will strike when they think their grievances are severe enough. This has proved true even in Great Britain under the blitz, with the Germans only twenty minutes away. Second, you must not freeze wages under a promise to keep prices down and then fail, for lack of courage, to fulfill the promise. Third, you cannot treat trade-union members as second-class citizens for two generations and not expect such treatment to leave scars that will become visible in moments of crisis. Fourth, it is clear that we haven't yet even begun to do the job of telling the men and women in the factories what this war means to them and to all the rest of us.

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Home Front and Battle Front

The debate in the Senate about whether we should fight Germany or Japan did more than reveal some dangerous misconceptions regarding Russia after the war and the present strength of the German army. It also revealed the failure of American propaganda on the home front. Eighteen months after Pearl Harbor, many Senators obviously believe that we can still fight and win an easy war—a war without many casualties abroad or serious deprivations at home; a war to be waged merely with our surplus products and surplus manpower—in other words, a sort of foreign work-project more exciting and more profitable than WPA. Much of the American public is known to hold the same opinions. Even our expeditionary force in Tunisia has been affected by them, to judge from Hanson Baldwin's recent series of articles in The New York Times.

Baldwin has sometimes been wrong in his conclusions, but he is a capable and thoroughly honest observer. He began his article of May 16 by paying a deserved tribute to the dash, bravery and effectiveness shown by American troops in the final drive for Bizerte. But then he said:

> There is a different attitude than in the Pacific; the Marines, the navy and the army units there have a personal grudge fight with the Japanese. In Tunisia most of the boys have been fighting for blueberry pie. They have been fighting for what they have known in the past, not for a better or more secure future; they might get a grudge against the Germans if one of their buddies was killed. They had—in the early months of the Tunisian campaign—no political connotation; there were no dynamic aims.
>
> Unlike the British Tommy, who is politically conscious to a high degree, the American "dogface" doesn't know what the shooting's all about. He's ebullient, happy-go-lucky; too often imbued with the idea of getting away with anything he can. He wants to "get this over with and get home quickly."

Who Is the Enemy?

Baldwin thinks that this state of mind helped to produce the faulty discipline that contributed to some of our early setbacks in Tunisia. He suggests that it

The Salaries Go Up

In his article beginning on page 722 of this issue, George Soule describes some of the ways in which business corporations under contract to the government can pad their expenses, including increased remuneration to their own officials. Point is lent to his remarks by a list published in a recent issue of Your Investments, the organ of the American Investors' Union, showing some interesting increases in salaries in recent years.

We do not know which of these firms have government contracts; but it seems to us probable that nearly all of them do. It is not surprising that labor should be restless, when it sees such lists as this and compares them with its own situation under the "Little Steel" formula.

		Remuneration Reported		
		1940	*1941*	*1942*
American Locomotive Company	W. Dickerman	75,954	77,239	114,091
Armour & Company	G. A. Eastwood	74,378	91,640	101,340
Aviation Corporation	V. Emanuel	25,000	79,150	88,917
Budd Wheel Company	E. G. Budd	110,428	117,629	140,318
Burlington Mills, Inc.	J. Spencer Love	91,940	179,652	196,340
Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc.	R. W. Moore	47,747	53,308	65,540
Doehler Die Casting Company	H. H. Doehler	35,930	49,824	56,105
Electric Storage Battery Company	R. C. Norberg	42,882	50,108	69,740
Fairbanks, Morse & Company	R. H. Morse	120,700	120,960	162,170
Firestone Tire & Rubber Company	J. W. Thomas	91,937	98,437	120,000
Flintkote Company	I. J. Harvey Jr.	53,370	55,326	90,050
General American Transportation Corporation	L. N. Selig	60,000	72,000	84,000
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company	E. J. Thomas	91,937	98,437	120,000
Kennecott Copper Company	E. T. Stannard	101,220	101,050	126,150
J. R. Kinney, Inc.	G. L. Smith	23,600	31,600	44,150
Lima Locomotive Works Company	J. E. Dixon	31,680	49,030	63,150
Loew's, Inc.	L. B. Mayer	697,048	704,425	949,766
Munsingwear, Inc.	E. L. Olrich	27,886	44,424	68,787
J. C. Penney Company	A. W. Hughes	47,975	72,059	81,155
Phelps Dodge Corporation	L. S. Cates	100,520	127,843	151,350
Savage Arms Company	F. F. Hickey	32,010	71,850	86,400
Snider Packing Corporation	S. E. Comstock	22,000	22,000	35,595
Sandard Oil Company (Ohio)	W. T. Holliday	90,000	90,000	120,000
Swift & Company	J. Holmes	65,000	74,442	85,000
Union Bag & Paper Company	A. S. Calder	86,829	86,829	100,731
Vick Chemical Company	H. S. Richardson	48,360	75,516	95,285
Walworth Company	W. B. Holton Jr.	60,000	95,250	120,000
Willys-Overland Motors Company	J. W. Frazer	60,000	102,593	123,184

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might be removed by a more thorough army training; but chiefly it is a weakness that goes back to civilian life. It is a fruit of our internal divisions and our lack of a fixed war policy—two handicaps that have kept the Office of War Information from doing an effective job. Essentially it is the same weakness that was shown in the Senate debate last week over whether we should now concentrate our major attack on Japan rather than on Germany.

In the same article, Baldwin mentions another weakness that goes back to the same sources in civilian life. He says, "There is a curious sort of self-pity about many of the men; a great resentment of the men at the front against those in rear areas; a real and perhaps dangerous anger against strikers at home." Always the hardships of wartime—whether in the army, in factories or simply at the corner grocery—cause an accumulation of resentments. Always these ought to be turned outwards, that is, against the enemy. But if we are doubtful about the nature of the enemy, or if he seems distant and impalpable, then the stored resentments are directed against other Americans—against strikers, or congressmen, or government red tape, or "that man in the White House." In such a fashion, our strength can be divided and consumed internally. If we are going to hate in wartime, we had better learn to hate the right people.

The Vice President v. Mr. Brailsford

In The New Republic of May 10, H. N. Brailsford wrote a communication, "Psychological Disarmament," in the course of which he quoted from Vice President Wallace on the subject of the future treatment of the conquered Axis nations. Mr. Brailsford strongly attacked the idea, which he attributed to Vice President Wallace, that American or British citizens should supervise formal education in Germany to make sure that it is democratic.

A friend of The New Republic has written us to say that in his judgment this is an unfair interpretation of Mr. Wallace's position. He sends us the text of a speech of Vice President Wallace on March 8 (after Mr. Brailsford had written his communication, but before it had been published). We quote the pertinent passages from this speech so that our readers can judge for themselves whether Mr. Brailsford correctly interprets Mr. Wallace's position:

> The evil influence of this systematic degradation of millions of German boys and girls cannot be counteracted in a short time. Even Hitler's death will not end it, because many of Hitler's children, conditioned as they are, will believe that he is still their leader, in the spirit if not in the flesh. Hitler dead may be almost as dangerous as Hitler alive.
>
> This, then, is the vastly difficult problem with which the United Nations will have to cope, if the victory which now is coming closer is to bring more than just a short breathing spell before another Prussian attack is launched upon the world.
>
> It is not up to the United Nations to say just what the German schools of the future should teach; and we do not want to be guilty of a Hitler-like orgy of book burning. But it is vital to the peace of the world to make sure that neither Prussianism, Hitlerism nor any modification of them is taught. There are many cultured German scholars with an excellent attitude toward the world who should be put to work on the job of rewriting the German textbooks in their own way. I believe these men would glorify peace and international honesty, reëstablishment of the German culture of Beethoven, Schubert, Schiller and Goethe, and the gradual preparation of the German spirit for an appreciation of the fact that a Bill of Rights for the individual is as vital as a Bill of Duties toward the State.
>
> Doubtless thousands of German boys will come home from the war bitterly disillusioned of Prussianism and Hitlerism. Thousands of both young and old at home will feel the same way. They will honestly want to help build up a new democratic Germany, and we, without yielding at all to the old warlike spirit of Prussia, should encourage them to try. We shall need the help of all Germans who give convincing evidence that they do not subscribe to the "master race" myth and are genuinely opposed to the doctrine that might makes right. The reëducation we insist upon should not crush out any sincere desire to practise democracy and live at peace among the world family of nations.
>
> It will not be necessary for Americans to teach in the German schools. The all-important thing is to see that the cult of war and international deceit is no longer preached as a virtue in the schools. We cannot countenance the soft, lazy forgetfulness which characterized England and France in their treatment of Germany in the thirties. The cost of such short-sighted appeasement is too great in men and money. We must not go down that mistaken, tragic road again.



Hungerford in The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette

Only the End of Round One

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The Death of the Comintern

THE ANNOUNCEMENT from Moscow that the Third International would be dissolved was in itself a curious bit of news. So was the fact that Prime Minister Churchill in his recent speech before Congress openly expressed the desire that he and President Roosevelt could confer with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Premier Stalin. Before that, the public had been speculating about the letter from Mr. Roosevelt to Mr. Stalin carried by former Ambassador Davies, which the President said was so secret that even Secretary Hull did not know its contents. Another area of discussion which has been occupying the public mind is the controversy over the relative importance of the Atlantic and the Pacific fronts. These apparently separate pieces of news may assume a larger meaning if they are woven into the general pattern of the war.

Hitler's strategy from the beginning has been to keep his allies united and his enemies divided, in order to put the latter out of action one at a time. Long before the war he began to play on the fear of Bolshevism in the Western world—even the official name of the treaty which binds the Axis is the "Anti-Comintern Pact." By his truce with Stalin, when he first struck in force he was enabled to deal with Poland, the Low Countries and France in turn, and hoped to render Britain *hors de combat* without having to protect his rear. When that attempt failed, he turned on Russia, expecting to conquer her before any substantial opposition could be mobilized in the West. Meanwhile his propaganda played incessantly on the menace of communism. This trick was too transparent to fool the governments of the United States and Britain, but it did influence the conservative isolationists in this country and had an enormous effect in Southeastern Europe. When the Russians offered unexpected resistance, Hitler still hoped to produce a stalemate by playing on the mutual suspicions of his enemies.

Meanwhile the decision of the Allies to concentrate their energies on Europe was exploited to the full among the Chinese, who had held out under unbelievable hardships in the hope that the democratic powers would come to their rescue. This was a double-pronged political offensive: if pleas from the Far East could weaken the forces deployed against Germany, Hitler would gain; if they were ignored, China might be persuaded to surrender and enter the Axis orbit.

All these dangers must have been foreseen by the leading statesmen of the Alliance. Stalin's decision to liquidate the Third International assumes its true importance only in the light of these facts. The Third International has really been dormant for many years; it was one of Trotsky's main charges that it had been rendered impotent as a revolutionary instrument. The plea of Moscow that it could not meet under war conditions loses force when one remembers that it had not met anyway since Stalin came to full power. Again and again he found it an embarrassment in the nationalist course upon which he long ago embarked. The American Communist Party severed its affiliation in 1940. In these circumstances the Comintern was mainly of service to Nazi-Fascist propaganda, and its abolition is significant as a symbol that Stalin believes it more important to conciliate Russia's allies and quiet suspicion than to push world revolution after the war.

The real irritation with the Communist Parties in the United States and Great Britain was not caused by any delusion that they constituted active or dangerous threats of proletarian revolution. It was generated in the first place by their political unscrupulousness in penetrating and gaining control over organizations representing other interests, and was redoubled by the demonstration early in the war that they were serving, not autonomous aims but the national purposes of the Soviet Union. Whether they will now cease doing so may be doubted, but Stalin's position emphasizes that these purposes include full coöperation with the aims of the democracies. As long as we remain friendly with the Soviet regime, it is not likely that the Communist Parties will try to make trouble or sow dissension.

An equally important symbol would be a meeting of the chiefs of the four great anti-Axis powers, a meeting which undoubtedly would not be held unless it could be followed by an announcement of complete agreement about war strategy and peace aims. In this area it is necessary to bring about union not only between Russia and the Western democracies but between all three and the Chinese Republic, which has long been pressing for more prompt aid from all three.

As we point out elsewhere in this issue, one school of thought regards Japan as a more dangerous enemy of the United States than Germany and would have us divert our main force to the Pacific theatre. It also clamors for entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan, even before Hitler is decisively defeated. But it is more than dubious whether closer unity can be or should be brought about on these terms.

As long as overwhelming force cannot be mustered in both theatres at once, it is a choice of evils which to postpone. If we make the major attack on Japan first, and the Soviet Union engages in hostilities against her, Hitler will be freed from any real menace on his west and can probably penetrate deeper into Russia's vitals. He might even get to the oil of the Near East and cut our communications with India, thus flanking the whole campaign. This would mean a far longer war, with an indecisive outcome.

It is true that Japan now has access to most of the materials necessary to constitute her a permanently great military power, and that to delay attacking her in force will give her time to exploit them. But they lie for the most part at the end of long lines of communi-

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cation. If we can harass these by submarine and air power while we are waiting for forces released from Europe, we can postpone the main assault on her without risking ultimate defeat.

Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt are eager to leave no doubt that they will strike at Japan in force as soon as feasible, and in the meantime will do everything possible to aid China. If at the same time China is convinced that the day of the Axis in Europe is ending, she will have little to gain and much to lose by withdrawal from the war. It was undoubtedly in the hope that the Generalissimo would see this point, and above all not speculate on the remote possibility that Russia would engage Japan until she has nothing more to fear from Hitler, that the Washington conference laid its new plans.

The Politics of Pacific Strategy

ON ANOTHER PAGE of The New Republic, Helen Fuller tells the Washington story of Senator Chandler's speech demanding that America change her basic war strategy and shift her major attention immediately from the European war theatre to Japan. As her article indicates, this is not a personal and "happy" inspiration on the part of the Senator himself, but is the vehicle for a movement that goes beyond him and is at present polarizing all the forces that once formed the "America First" group. If these men can manage it, the strategic winds from America will blow west toward the Orient, rather than east toward Europe.

The political direction of this "Japs-First" bloc is very nearly as clear as its military direction. It is motivated by a basic malaise about a struggle which is being waged in Europe against fascists, and a struggle which is being waged in alliance with the British and the Russians. One must remember that the men who are rallying to Chandler's support—Clark, Wheeler, Brooks and the others—have been isolationists mainly with respect to Europe's difficulties. Emotionally they have never seen any reason why we should interfere with Germany's thrust toward complete power over Europe. Our entrance into the war forced them to submerge this feeling, but it is still there, and the issue of shifting our strength to the Japanese front gives them a good occasion to express it again.

These men are not basically anti-fascist. If you search carefully through their public utterances you will find very little evidence of an understanding of the anti-democratic character of fascism. Actually—while this does not apply to Senator Chandler himself—the newspapers and the Senators who have been supporting his position have a much more consistent record of hostility to the British and the Russians. The fact is that they fear to envisage a Europe in which the two great powers will be the constitutional democracy of Britain and the socialist state of Russia. The fact is that they fear above all the unleashing of the strength of revolutionary democracy in Europe that will come with the quick, complete and smashing defeat of the Nazis. They want to damp down the fires of democratic mass belief all over the world.

That the withdrawal of America from Europe now will leave the British and the Russians in the lurch is not therefore to them a prospect from which they recoil. And that their proposal would inevitably have the consequence of giving the Germans an ultimate victory in Europe or—at worst—a stalemate peace, again does not seem to frighten them unduly.

How much appeal can such a movement as this, with such motivations and such an outlook, have for the American people? There can be little doubt that it has enough appeal to be dangerous. There are many Americans who have always shrunk from the rigors demanded by a total war against a powerful and ruthless combination of enemies. They have thought that we could fight a "soft war"—one in which our material strength and our money could purchase for us immunity from very much suffering. Senator Chandler kept warning in his speech that an attack now on the European continent would mean the loss of many American lives. Presumably he feels that we could fight the Japanese with our surplus ships and materials, without needing to sacrifice soldiers. And although this prospect is utterly false, it still has an appeal for those who want a soft war.

It is also true that the Chandler thesis has some appeal to Americans who hate the British and fear the Russians more than they hate and fear fascism. It has an appeal to those who have never become reconciled to a war against Hitler, nor to a war in alliance with Russia. It is an appeal, finally, to those who have a special hatred for the Japanese because of their color; and to those who are so bitterly against President Roosevelt that they will use any stick to beat him.

Yet while the psychological soil exists in this country for the Chandler doctrines to grow in, the majority reasoning and conviction is against him, and supports the President and the basic strategy that the United Nations have agreed upon. Mr. Churchill's speech to Congress was well received, and the portion of it devoted to the British promise to help us to the utmost and to the end in the Pacific war was greeted with enthusiasm not only throughout the country but in Congress as well. There is a strong feeling that any army or navy officers who fed Chandler with distorted material to support his thesis were playing politics with the war, and that by going over the head of their Commander-in-Chief they were getting very close to insubordination and even treason. And there is, finally, a strong conviction that, whatever be the quarrels that the tory alliance in Congress has with the President, the strategy of the war cannot be run by Congress—

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despite Chandler's demand that the Senate sit in on the sessions of the Combined General Staffs. We had our experiences, and bitter ones, during the Civil War with a congressional committee that sought to run it.

All this has dealt thus far with the political and the psychological factors in the Chandler rebellion. The crucial military considerations against it seem too clear to need comment, but tories like Chandler and Bridges and Vandenberg and Wheeler seem never to learn anything nor to forget anything.

It is a basic military principle that in a far-flung war you strike the enemy hardest on the battle-front where he is already reeling from our blows, and where a finishing blow can be delivered with the greatest strength. That front is the European. The Hitler disasters in the Russian campaigns and in Tunisia, the present plight of Italy, the presence of large, politically conscious, fiercely anti-fascist populations in Europe which will aid our armies—all these considerations point to Europe as the crucial front for the decisive blow.

As to the Chandler-Bridges argument that if we do not crush the Japanese immediately, they will strengthen their hold on empire and consolidate their gains, that is unfortunately true. It is always true that the front on which you are fighting a holding war is the one on which the enemy will consolidate his strength. But, as Elmer Davis well pointed out in his broadcast, this applies even more to the German front than the Japanese. The Germans have conquered a territory richer in resources and in industrial strength than even the conquests made by the Japanese. The Germans have displayed an organizing ability and power to assimilate these conquests superior even to those of the Japanese. If time works on the side of the Japanese, it works even more on the side of the Germans. No argument can be made here about either front on the score of time and the consolidation of strength that would not apply to the other front as well.

But what is crucial is the relative strength of the two enemy allies? That is what must determine the primacy that must be accorded to one or the other in our strategy. If the Japanese are beaten and the Germans are let alone, then it may be hopeless ever to beat the Germans decisively. They may become truly invulnerable behind their European fortress. But if the Germans are beaten first and beaten decisively, the Japs can still be destroyed—perhaps within a year or two at the most. The combined fleets of America and Britain, the combined air power of America and Britain, the combined land power of America and China and Britain: Japan could not possibly stand up against such an attack. If to that you add Russian bases and strength, the result is swift.

To those who argue that the British and the Russians "may" not help us with Japan, the answer is that if we abandon them now in Europe, they will surely not help us in Asia.

Lynch Law in Washington

A WEEK AGO, we told our readers of a grave miscarriage of justice that was being plotted in Washington. The House of Representatives was about to vote on an urgent appropriation bill which included a clause forbidding the payments of salaries to three men charged with "affiliation" with seditious groups. These men are Robert Morss Lovett, Goodwin Watson and William E. Dodd Jr. In the week that has elapsed, the House of Representatives, to its permanent disgrace, passed the bill. It has gone to the Senate, which may have acted before these words are read. There is some reason to hope, however, that the Senate may reverse the action of the House. If it does, much of the credit should go to a magnificent statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee by Secretary Ickes.

Mr. Ickes has written one of the finest fighting documents we have read in many a day. His particular purpose was to defend Robert Morss Lovett, an employee of his own department, which the other two men are not; but he also attacked in telling fashion the whole policy of the Dies-Kerr combination in the House.

As for Dr. Lovett, Mr. Ickes makes a series of important points which we summarize:

For twenty years Dr. Lovett was president of the League for Industrial Democracy, a Socialist organization that was constantly attacked by the Communists except during a short period when they were ordered by Moscow not to do so.

Dr. Lovett is accused only of holding opinions, not of acting under them. Such an accusation is a violation of American principles even if the charges regarding his opinions were true, which they are not.

He was given no semblance of a fair trial. He was not permitted to be represented by counsel or even by an observer from the Department of the Interior. He was not allowed to know the charges against him in advance so that he could collect documents or otherwise prepare his answers.

> The test of the fitness of an officer of the government [Mr. Ickes says] cannot fairly be the political views of persons with whom he has in the past been associated for non-political objectives. The very organizations used by Congressman Dies and the Kerr Subcommittee to brand Mr. Lovett as "subversive" could be used to pin the same label on Wendell Willkie, Thomas E. Dewey, Frank Murphy, Robert H. Jackson, Cordell Hull, James Farley and Harold L. Ickes; Senators Pepper, Elbert D. Thomas, Wagner, Green, Murray and Murdock; Representatives Thomas F. Ford, Edward Izak, John M. Coffee, John Lesinski, Emanuel Celler, Michael J. Bradley and Adolph Sabath, and Federal Judges William Holley and Louis Schwellenbach.

Mr. Ickes points out that "the only satisfactory or fair test is how the man is doing his job, what the people whom he serves think of him and what is his

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standing among his neighbors." He quotes a joint letter from the two municipal councils of the Virgin Islands declaring they have found Dr. Lovett throughout his four years of service "an American gentleman, a patriotic citizen and a humane administrator," and saying that they see in him the symbol of the American flag for which their sons are fighting. The two newspapers of the Virgin Islands support him; so does the Businessmen's Association of St. Thomas.

Mr. Ickes also quotes from letters written on Dr. Lovett's behalf by people who could have no possible sympathy with communism or any kind of subversion. They include Thomas W. Lamont, chairman of J. P. Morgan and Company; Edward Burling and George Rublee, senior partners of Washington's largest law firm; Judge Learned Hand of the United States Court of Appeals; Christopher Chenery, president of the Federal Water Service Corporation, and Laird Bell, senior partner of an outstanding Chicago law firm.

The Kerr Committee tried to frighten the House, and perhaps succeeded, by saying that six organizations with which Dr. Lovett was said to be affiliated were found by the Department of Justice to be "within the scope of Public Law 135 and Public Law 644." This sounds sinister, but in fact it only means that since some of the members were Communists, membership in these organizations should be investigated. But the Attorney General pointed out that membership in these groups itself proved nothing, since the programs appeared innocent on their face and most members were not Communists. Mr. Ickes, commenting on the Kerr Committee charge that the platforms of these organizations paralleled the Communist election program of 1940 in numerous respects, adds: "So did the Republican and Democratic platforms of 1940 'parallel' the Communist platform in many respects, it being the custom of all political platforms to promise prosperity, civil rights, international peace and universal happiness."

Still more serious is Mr. Ickes' statement of the origin of the charges:

> On page 11 of the Kerr report is a list of cabalistic initials which I suppose are intended to list Lovett's organizations. I do not know what the initials mean and I doubt if the Kerr Subcommittee does. But the interesting thing is that the same list, word for word, is found at page 302 of the unsavory "Red Network," by Elizabeth Dilling, who is now under indictment for sedition.
>
> Again, at page 10 of the Kerr report is found another list of organizations. This bit is advanced as a part of the text of the Committee's own report. But in fact it is taken from one Walter S. Steele who on August 17, 1938, made the same statement, word for word and comma for comma, to the Dies Committee. His statement is found at page 681 of Volume One of the 1938 Dies Hearings.
>
> Steele, for the Committee's information, is the editor of a sheet called The National Republic. He represents fascist or semi-fascist groups such as The Christian American Crusade, the Paul Reveres of Chicago and the Vigilant Intelligence Federation. These organizations peddle anti-Jewish propaganda and whip up Red scares. They have been on the regular mailing lists of the German propaganda machine, and are officered or endorsed by men such as Aryan and Sanctuary, now under indictment for sedition.

Mr. Ickes was equally impressive in urging the impropriety of the proposed action in general. The action is unconstitutional, he says, because it invades the executive powers of the President. The First Congress "was entirely clear that it had no power whatever to remove any executive officer." The Supreme Court has always followed the same rule, "from as early as 1839 to the present day." The Constitution "provides an elaborate procedure for the removal of officers." Moreover, "a man under our Constitution is entitled to counsel when tried even for minor criminal offenses, where the only issue is whether or not a simple act was done. Here the charge, subversive activity against our government in time of war, is far more serious. The penalty, a reflection upon the man's good name and the loss of his livelihood, is far greater. The issues, involving the balance of the whole of his past life, are far more complicated. Yet the Kerr Subcommittee not only denied the right of counsel but conducted its interrogation in a secret session, the transcript of which is still unavailable. This, I submit, is not the American way to do things. This indeed is an un-American activity."

Mr. Ickes has done all he can to bring Congress back from its determined effort to follow the paths of fascism rather than those of democracy. It behooves the rest of us to help him as much as we can. We again urge you to write to your Senators, your Representatives, and tell them what you think of this sort of business. Do so no matter what is the situation of these cases at the moment of writing. Send a copy of your letter to The New Republic, as many of you have already done. As we said last week, fascism in Germany began with violations of civil liberties no more serious than these.

THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

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The Profit Stays in War

In the long, long ago of the interbellum period, there was a powerful movement to take the profit out of war. This movement rested not only on the unquestioned premise that there had been enormous profiteering in past wars, but on the now thoroughly disproved assumption that wars happen because munitions-makers foment them. The manufacturers of war materials, on our side at least, did not want this war, and even after it had started they were so reluctant to produce enough that they nearly lost it for us. But how far have we got toward taking the profit out?

What the Figures Show. – Our first step in finding out is naturally to inspect whatever figures of profit are available. These figures are far from complete or up-to-date, and they have, for our purpose, important defects which will be explained later. Still it is interesting to see what can be inferred, if we take them at their face value.

According to a compilation by the National City Bank, the net incomes of all active corporations in the United States, the federal income taxes they pay and the net incomes after these taxes, are tabulated as follows (in billions of dollars):

Year	*Net Income Before Federal Taxes*	*Federal Income Taxes*	*Net Income After Federal Taxes*
1939	5.2	1.2	4.0
1940	7.3	2.5	4.8
1941	13.8	6.6	7.2
1942	18.8	12.0	6.8

In 1939 business was recovering from the slump of 1938, and although Hitler struck in September, we can take it for about as nearly a "normal" year of peace as we are likely to find. By 1940, business had begun to feel the consequences of Allied war orders and our defense program. The following year was one of immense stimulation produced by the construction and tooling-up stage; the civilian economy had been subject to few curbs and was booming as never before. And of course 1942 was the first full year of war for us, when government spending was enormous, but many war plants had not yet swung into production.

The raw figures show that corporate net income was more than tripled between the first year and the last. Taxes on these profits increased much more rapidly than the profits themselves: if we regard all the gain above the 1939 level as due to the war, taxes recovered about 70 percent of that gain. This still left the corporations in 1942, however, with the respectable increase of $2,800,000,000 in profit, or about 70 percent above 1939. There can be no doubt that a lot of profit has been left in war.

How about 1943? The National City Bank has tabulated the figures for the first quarter issued by 260 of the leading industrial corporations, which are fairly representative of industry as a whole. Net income after deduction for taxes is seven percent higher than in the first quarter of 1942. This figure may be altered by renegotiation of contracts and retroactive changes in the tax law, but there is no probability whatever that either Congress or the war administration will do anything to cancel the profit gain already registered. The trend of profits is upward.

What Do War Profits Mean? – Having settled that there are great profits, it remains to discover what they mean to the government, labor and the cost of living. Are the munitions-makers squeezing the orange dry? Some light is thrown on this question by a more detailed analysis of the accounts of forty great manufacturers devoted almost exclusively to war, and dominating many fields of production.

The figures appear to show that the cost of munitions to the government would not be enormously lessened if all profit were eliminated. The total revenues of these companies in 1942 were $13,895,000,000; their total net income after taxes was $587,000,000. If the government had paid just what it cost to produce the goods, and had collected no taxes, it would thus in the end have paid about four cents less for each dollar's worth of munitions it bought, if we can take the figures at their face value.

There has of course been a tremendous increase in the money received by these companies. Where has the money gone? In 1942, out of each dollar taken in, roughly 47 cents were paid out for materials and miscellaneous expenses. Another 35 cents went for wages and salaries. State, local and miscellaneous taxes took about four cents, while the federal government's cut, in income and excess-profits taxes, was about nine cents. Three cents were paid in dividends, leaving a cent and a half of undistributed profit.

It would be hard to prove on the basis of these or any other known figures that the profits of munitions-makers are directly responsible for the rise in the cost of living or directly threaten inflation. The sum paid in dividends, while it gives very large incomes to a small proportion of the population, is only a fraction of the sum paid in wages and salaries—less than one-eleventh. The payrolls of these companies nearly doubled between 1940 and 1942, increasing 96 percent, while the dividends paid by them decreased 20 percent and the profits retained decreased 11 percent.

Price statistics show that the increase in the cost of living has been confined almost exclusively to farm

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products and food, which these manufacturers do not produce. Indeed, they produce scarcely anything for civilians any more. Therefore, if they are at all to blame for the high cost of living, it is not because of the cost of the goods they sell, but because of the effect on the markets for consumers' goods of the money they pay out, primarily in expenses, wages and salaries, and secondarily—a long distance behind—in dividends.

What Is Wrong with This Picture? – The picture presented above is substantially accurate as far as it goes, but it is far from telling the whole story. If you are a good business man, and you know that for every extra dollar you show in profits, the government is going to take a large and increasing amount, you are likely to try to find ways of spending money or salting it away that will not be subject to war taxes. People ordinarily suppose that profits are something tangible and concrete, something with a fixed definition. They are ignorant of the intricacy of modern accounting, and of the fact that judgments as to policy may make a big difference in what the books show on a given volume of business. This does not mean that great corporations deliberately falsify their records to escape taxation; they do nothing for which their officials could be put in jail. And they are pretty carefully checked by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. But it does mean that you have to look behind such crude and simple figures as these if you want the whole truth.

That item of miscellaneous expenses covers a lot of ground. One can, for instance, make minor improvements to property that ordinarily would be entered as a capital investment and amortized over a long period, charging them all to expense in a single year. The law specifically allows plant additions necessary for defense purposes to be amortized within five years; one-fifth the cost being deducted each year before profits are reckoned. That in itself greatly enlarges expenses and reduces profit in the many cases where big additions have been made. Two or three years after the end of the war, at most, the companies will therefore possess, without further cost to themselves, enormously more valuable properties. But even more than this is possible. A company may try to charge enough in its contract to pay the cost of the addition, and then demand the amortization privilege in addition, thus being reimbursed twice for the same investment. A section of the law originally guarded against this, but it delayed the beginning of work, so contract review was substituted.

Some companies have been allowed to enlarge their plants when sufficient capacity was already available elsewhere. This was time-consuming in addition to being expensive. In one case, says the Truman Committee, "Company A applied for a certificate for amortization on a new plant, admitting its new plant would not increase productive capacity, but claiming that a new building was necessary in order to avoid dangers from sabotage existing at the old site. Although the certificate was granted to this concern for such construction, a further certificate was also issued to Company B for the purchase of the first company's discarded plant, even though Company B was using that plant as a subcontractor on the very contract for which Company A had believed that a new plant was necessary."

Figures available in a few industries for selected companies indicate that in spite of apparently moderate rates of profit, these companies are going to come out of the war with far more valuable properties. In electrical machinery, for instance, assets of the companies used as samples increased from $650,000,000 in 1939 to $1,295,000,000 in 1942. Assets of certain non-ferrous-metal-products companies actually more than doubled in the same three years, rising from $442,800,000 to $892,400,000. Rubber companies increased their property from $710,000,000 to $972,000,000. The figures are not in for many industries, and the end is not yet.

Another item in that omnibus category of miscellaneous charges is reserves. Reserves for depreciation are familiar, and it is well known how making them larger or smaller can almost arbitrarily affect profits. But now there are special reserves laid aside for post-war eventualities. Everybody would agree that war profits may be ephemeral, and that it is prudent to save something against an uncertain future. Nevertheless these reserves act to diminish the profits shown on the books, on which taxes are paid, and there is every motive to make them as big as possible.

Advertising is a good way to spend money, and it is supposed to build up permanent good will for the company, even though at the moment the company has nothing for sale to the reader of the advertising. We have all seen many handsome full-color pages of that sort of thing. Even the apparently innocent cost of goods bought may include a lot of items that ordinarily we would not think of. The Truman Committee calls attention to the sums paid by manufacturers and other contractors to the gentry in Washington who make a business of getting them government orders. The fees and commissions of these agents "were so excessive as to become scandalous and shocking to the public conscience." And why not, since most of them worked on a contingent basis, and their bills became costs of the successful bidders, to be charged to the government before profits were reckoned? "It was shown that the amounts being paid to these agents in selling commissions and fees in respect to subcontracts were at least as great as the amounts being paid in connection with prime contracts. All of this expense, of course, must ultimately be borne by the taxpayers." Though the big corporations probably did not feel the need of these brokers so keenly as the small fry, since the important companies were already in touch with the government purchasing agencies, the expenses of the big companies for goods bought from subcontractors cover fat fees.

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And then of course there are the salaries paid to company officials. Most of these officials own blocks of stock in their companies. It may bring them a net benefit if the company makes less profit and pays smaller dividends, while the loss in dividends is more than made up to the fortunate few by a boost in salary or a kind of bonus. We do have high rates in the upper brackets of personal income taxes, but there is no excess-income tax to match the excess-profits tax.

There are certain offsets to excessive profits. Under a law now in effect for a little over a year, the government has renegotiated contracts and brought about reductions in price for articles which, in the hurry of the first orders and the inexperience of the manufacturers with new types of output, were sold too dear. Savings realized by this activity had totaled $2,539,000,000 on March 1 of this year. But it is optimistic to hope that this process will stop all the leaks.

We are going to have another crop of war millionaires. If you don't believe it, make a tour of those shrewd business men, the dealers in old paintings, tapestries, *objets d'art*. Their prices have risen sky-high, and they are not anxious to sell at any price.

The Psychological Effect.—It is known in every community that war profits are big, much larger than peace profits. It is known also that these profits are being made by almost all businesses needed for the war effort, and practically without risk of loss. Economic theory justifies profits on the ground that they are a reward for risk and enterprise. Most people do not know economic theory, but they do feel that there is something wrong when business refuses to expand without a virtual guarantee against any loss—the government either paying outright for plant expansion or allowing the contractors to recover for it out of profits—and then business receives enough for the product so that nobody can possibly lose, and some make fortunes out of the nation's necessity.

It can be argued that such results are not the product of calculated greed, but are almost inevitable when the government suddenly appears as a buyer for far more than business is equipped to produce, and there is urgent need for speed without too much calculation of cost. But almost everybody has heard of cases on or off the record, usually applying to the upstarts and camp-followers of war rather than to the established businesses, in which real profiteering, graft or dishonesty has occurred. It is unlikely that the operators of black markets, for instance, will report their profits on the financial pages or even to the tax collectors. And there has been something corresponding to the black market at every level of the war effort.

Labor especially is conscious that Congress has left such loopholes in the excess-profits tax that it fails to recover as much as in other nations at war, or enough to prevent windfall gains. It knows that Congress has refused to limit salaries. Why, ask the workers, when we are being drafted for the army, should we also be expected to do without wage increases as the cost of living rises, although capital not only is not drafted but is receiving war bonuses?

It may be proved statistically that the chief cause of the rising cost of living is not the profits of munitions-makers but the increased purchasing power of labor, coupled with the activity of organized agriculture. It may also be proved that if labor contributes to inflation by continued demands for more money, it will gain no more goods, but rather will in the end increase war profits. But logic will not prevent labor from upsetting the applecart if it continues to be subject to moral injustice.

The Post-War Effect.—It has many times been noted that since most of the war business has gone to the big concerns, while the little ones have suffered, the net effect will be greatly to strengthen big business after the war. Since most of the small concerns which have shared the orders have done so as subcontractors for the big ones, there is also a marked tendency toward concentration of industrial control.

Consider two more factors. Big business will come out of the war with great additions to plant and equipment, free and clear of debt, most of it modern and highly productive. It will also come out with reserves of unprecedented size, giving it immense financial power. Thus the chief enemy of the New Deal administration has become the chief gainer under it.

Not all the new equipment is designed for civilian production, and that which can be changed over may remain idle if there is not enough demand for its product. Post-war overproduction has been the ogre of big business from the beginning. It is possible, therefore, that big business will use its power to restrict output and its reserves to try to sit out the depression which would ensue from that policy. This menace can hardly be overemphasized.

The chief lesson of war profits, however, would lead to a different outcome, better not only for labor and all the rest of us, but for business itself. Great profits are now being made *without increase in the price of factory products*. They are simultaneously being made *with a great increase in the income of labor*, achieved largely through full employment, but also in part through wage advances. All this is the consequence of *full and increasing production*. Capitalism, or private enterprise, or whatever you wish to call the present set-up, is therefore not inconsistent with the welfare of labor or the public, if it can only produce as much as its technical equipment permits. If, on the other hand, it fails to bring about, or to permit the government to bring about, full production and full employment when the war is over, it cannot long keep either its profits or its power.

GEORGE SOULE

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The "Japs-First" Bloc

Should the War Strategy Be Reversed?

WASHINGTON LAST WEEK saw an extraordinary, not to say disgraceful, attempt to turn the whole strategy of the war by means of pressure on public opinion. The leader, nominally at least, was Sen. A. B. "Happy" Chandler of Kentucky. The quality of his statesmanship is perhaps indicated by his nickname.

Before he presented himself as a military authority, Chandler was a 100-percent supporter of the President's foreign policies both before and since Pearl Harbor. But on the Monday preceding Prime Minister Churchill's address to Congress, Chandler rose in the Senate to lead a three-hour floor show apparently designed to undermine confidence in our Commander-in-Chief and create distrust of our allies. Senators Tydings and Bridges joined Chandler in singing the solo parts, and the old isolationist (*alias* America First) glee club—Senators Brooks, Clark (Mo.), Wheeler, Walsh, Shipstead and Vandenberg—made up a loud chorus. They demanded that the Roosevelt-Churchill conference, then meeting at the White House, call off the war in Europe and order immediate defeat of Japan. They shouted about Japan's growing might, predicted that the United States would be deserted by Britain and Russia and and left to fight Japan alone if Hitler is defeated first, then threatened Roosevelt with that fate worse than death, the kind of hostile Senate which blocked Woodrow Wilson at the end of the last war, unless he surrendered to them now.

The burden of Chandler's argument was that we have now gone far enough in Europe to let up there and start against Japan. We should substitute attrition for aggression in Europe, the better to hold in check the greedy Russians who, according to Chandler, are only waiting for a chance to walk out on us and gobble up as much of Europe as they can grab away from a similarly voracious Britain. It is not quite clear whether Chandler and his friends think the United States ought to be in there grabbing territory along with the rest, or just want us to be in a position to act as referee. Neither is it clear how he thinks our influence in Europe will be increased by turning our backs on the Continent now.

It is not easy to determine how Senator Chandler came to stand as leader in this new isolationism, this sinister rebirth of the America First philosophy. Perhaps it all started when he headed a Military Affairs Subcommittee investigating Alaskan and West Coast bases last August. There he conferred with high-ranking officers. What was said is not known except from the Senator's subsequent reports, but it is a safe guess that, like all commanders, the men with whom he talked complained that they were not getting enough men or enough supplies, that if we had had sufficient force soon enough, we need not have suffered our reverses in the Aleutians, and so on. Commanders in any one area always talk this way, and a more sophisticated statesman than the gentleman from Kentucky would have known how to discount such talk. Chandler evidently did not. He came back from the tour of investigation apparently profoundly convinced that the strategy of the war was all a mistake and that he now knew more, and had a better judgment, than the top military officials of the United Nations.

From that point it was just a step to becoming a chief alarmist on the Jap menace inside the United States. Chandler, early this year, managed to get himself named as head of another subcommittee, this time to look into the relocation centers for Japanese who had been evacuated from the West Coast area. Since then he has been visiting camps and denouncing at a great rate what he saw in them. There has been a persistent rumor around Washington that at an early stage in his own personal "Pacific-consciousness," Chandler received overtures from Hearst representatives, keen on strengthening their traditional yellow-scare editorial policy, who offered him nationwide publicity and backing for a national office in return for constant harping on the Japs-First and Yellow-Peril-at-Home tunes. Regardless of the truth of the rumor, large hunks of Hearst front pages have recently been devoted to Chandler's "exposés" of Japanese relocation centers, and a Hearst correspondent in Washington, Ray Richards of The Los Angeles Examiner, is most often the one who floats Chandler's atrocity stories about the decent methods the War Relocation Authority has used in handling our Japanese American evacués.

While Happy was still out stirring up the Yellow Peril at home, in mid-March General MacArthur dispatched his Air Commander, Gen. George Kenney, and Gen. Richard Sutherland to Washington to plead for additional planes and other equipment. They were still around when Chandler got back to town from his Jap hunt.

Early in April the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Herbert V. Evatt, arrived in the United States and spoke to the exclusive Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, on his way to Washington, praising MacArthur and contending that not even the minimum supplies which Roosevelt and Churchill would regard as essential even for the "Beat-Hitler-

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First" strategy were being shipped to the Southwest Pacific. The next day, MacArthur reaffirmed Evatt's contentions in a statement commemorating the anniversary of the fall of Bataan. Evatt left San Francisco for Washington, and almost as soon as he arrived, statements from Australia predicated on an invasion scare were pouring in to back up the pleas he had been sent to make. General Kenney, Prime Minister Curtin and many others cried out about the peril they thought they were in. Several British papers cautioned these men to stop crying "Wolf." Secretary of War Stimson was sympathetic but unemotional in his response to Evatt's requests. "It is common to all vigorous and alert commanders to seek more equipment," he said. A few days later, Senate Majority Leader Barkley, Chandler's senior colleague, spoke more sharply on this point: "I do not know to what extent any particular general ought to go over the heads of superior officers, through newspaper propaganda, to build a fire under the high-ranking officers in order that he may get what he wants regardless of what may happen to other generals in other fields. I am not familiar with that particular type of military tactics. It may be all right, but it strikes me as being more political than military."

It was April 15 when the invasion-scare messages hit Washington. On April 16 Chandler made a long-winded speech in the Senate about the urgency of the Pacific situation. He reported at great length on what had been said to him in the course of his tour of investigation by General Buckner, commanding the Alaskan territory, and General DeWitt, commandant of the whole Western area. But that had already been eight months ago, as Senators Barkley and Hill were quick to remind him. Unconcerned, Chandler plowed on heavily, despite the sharp answers Hill and Barkley made to his flimsy arguments.

Following Chandler's speech, the crisis of our strategy began to mount. As the certainty of victory in Tunisia became ever more clear, the logic of a second front in Europe this year was also manifest to almost any interested observer. Churchill again turned up in Washington for an important strategy conference, flanked by a full accompaniment of military and naval men.

As a result of these developments, a depression could be seen to settle over some of the old isolationists and the new Beat-the-Fourth-Termers who feared that political success for their sworn enemy, Franklin Roosevelt, might accompany the military successes apparently in the offing. They began to thrash about for ammunition to use against the new plans. Perhaps they thought Chandler provided a good, untainted rallying point. Then there were such violent anti-Roosevelt leaders as Styles Bridges and Millard Tydings, who could be counted on to join in wherever they could make their weight felt in opposition to the President. There were the discredited isolationists. And then there was an additional source of strength, the residual army and navy preference for fighting Japs rather than Germans, resulting from many causes—for example, their contempt for yellow men built up in the course of tours of duty in the Pacific, and the resultant horror at having these "inferiors" overrun our men as they did after December 7. And always, ready to coöperate with these forces, the McCormick-Patterson press stood by. All those cross-currents were running in the Senate. Roosevelt and Churchill, with their military and naval chiefs, were conferring at the White House, and it was known that the Prime Minister would address Congress on the state of the war when Chandler rose in the Senate on May 17 to repeat his April 16 oration about the Pacific, with gestures, and this time with warm support from those interest groups mentioned above.

What do you get when you put these facts together and allow for some missing ones?

Was Chandler's plea for transfer of action to the Pacific made, as he strongly indicated, at the request of top army and navy officials who dare not speak up to their Commander-in-Chief in their own persons?

Was this a new America First drive employing a new front man?

Was it a part of the anti-fourth-term move, aimed at discrediting the judgment of Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief, at insinuating that Churchill dominates Roosevelt in military decisions?

Or was it, as Chandler declared, just a little thing he thought up all by himself?

The right answer should become clear before long. The truth comes out more quickly now than in ordinary times.

In his speech to Congress last week, Winston Churchill gave clear and ringing answers to the questions raised by the "Japs-First" bloc. His speech satisfies the questions of many of Chandler's sympathizers, but the Senator has declared that he is standing pat on his twice-repeated but still specious argument. In other words, he intends to go on headline-hunting at the expense of much needed unity on a European second front now.

Probably the decisions made at this latest strategy conference will prove to be the most important of this war. They must not be colored by any misapprehensions about American public opinion based on the antics of Senator Chandler and his crew of happy wreckers. If we are to get ahead with this war as rapidly as necessary, we must learn that our Chandlers must be isolated and dealt with speedily whenever and wherever they appear to stand in the way of our fight for existence.

HELEN FULLER

Washington

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The Senator from Minnesota

MOST AMERICANS who have heard of Joseph Hurst Ball, the junior Senator from Minnesota, know him only as an anonymous one-fourth of the Ball-Burton-Hatch-Hill resolution, which, they understand vaguely, is a Senate gesture toward international organization. The slightly better informed are aware that Senator Ball, along with Sen. Harold H. Burton of Ohio, is a Republican, and consequently somewhat more surprising as a sponsor of the resolution than Democratic Sens. Carl A. Hatch of New Mexico and Lister Hill of Alabama. But as an independent personality, even with the flurry of publicity caused by the resolution, Ball is practically unknown outside his own state and Washington.

Ball is that strange political being, a Stassen Republican, a type that will become of increasing importance as the 1944 elections approach. The Stassen Republicans are the new hope for the Grand Old Party, the bright young men who combine liberalism on international affairs, including a real perception of the nature of the war and the peace, with a program ranging from middle-of-the-road to reactionary on domestic affairs, and theirs may be the magic formula that will capture the presidency in 1944 or 1948. Willkie has been for the most part the assumed leader and standard-bearer of the Stassen forces, although it would seem from Governor Stassen's not-too-favorable review of his new book, "One World," in The New York Times a month or so ago, that they distrust what they regard as his current, somewhat flamboyantly leftist, direction.

In all of this, Ball himself is something of an unknown quantity. He is Stassen's man, having been appointed by the Governor in 1940 to fill out the unexpired term of Senator Lundeen, and he is sympathetic to Willkie, at least to the extent that the Ball-Burton-Hatch-Hill resolution was generally interpreted as having been framed along the lines of Willkie's ideas, with Willkie himself coming out strongly in its favor. Before the resolution, Ball's principal activity in the Senate was crusading for intervention before Pearl Harbor and strong United Nations coöperation after Pearl Harbor, and acting as a moderate on the labor question, somewhere midway between labor's friends and labor's foes.

Ball's attitude toward labor was perhaps best expressed by the Ball bill, modeled on the Railway Labor Act and the Minnesota Labor Relations Act, which he offered to the Senate in November of 1940. It provided for a twenty-day cooling-off period in defense industries before strikes or lockouts could be declared, and compulsory conciliation by the director of the United States Conciliation Service. Although it was generally felt that the Ball bill was preferable to the Connally bill and others at the time, and thus an improvement on what a good part of the Senate would have *liked* to do to labor, labor made its opposition clear. Philip Murray came out sharply against the bill, arguing that it would destroy collective bargaining and upset the voluntary no-strike agreement, and although the Senate Labor subcommittee approved the bill and passed it on to committee, action was indefinitely deferred and the bill died.

Aside from this flurry of mild labor-baiting, Ball's behavior in the Senate has been relatively quiet. When he was first appointed to fill out Lundeen's term, he was something of a human-interest figure as the youngest, or baby, Senator, and a great newspaper fuss was made about his registering for the draft the day before he took his oath. His first real speech in the Senate, in the fall of 1941, was an urgent plea for the repeal of the Neutrality Act. He next achieved public notice in early 1942, when he offered amendments to the price-control bill that would have put salaries under $5,000 and wages under 60 cents an hour outside the presidential authority.

This year, before the B-B-H-H resolution, he offered only one bill, to make the Little Steel formula part of the Stabilization Act, and since then his principal activity has been working and speaking on behalf of the resolution and the point of view it expressed. He is a member of three key committees, the invaluable Truman, Banking and Currency, and Education and Labor, and has been relatively active on all of them, particularly on the Truman Committee, where he has been an intelligent investigator.

Ball's background is more suggestive of political promise than this relatively meager record in the Senate would seem to warrant. Physically, he is almost ideal for a politician, tall (six foot three), unpressed, and attractive in a homespun fashion. He stoops so habitually that he looks older than his thirty-eight years; he has a deep, measured voice, gnarled hands, a seamed, rugged face, an iron-gray cowlick, thick black eyebrows, and, in general, the combination of brooding melancholy and grinning humor that makes swooning lady journalists think immediately of Lincoln.

Ball's early life is just as perfect for a political career. He grew up in the little town of Crookston, Minnesota, a tiny unspoiled segment of the great Midwest. He achieved his schooling in the best Lincoln tradition of self-reliance, getting himself to Antioch College by borrowing fifty acres from his father, renting a team and plow from a neighbor and raising a crop (early maturing seed corn, according to The

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Ladies' Home Journal) that paid expenses and made enough of a profit to get him started at school. At Antioch, under the half-time work program, he tried his hand at a number of trades, including telephone linesman, carpenter's helper, factory worker and chemical researcher. In all, he spent three years at Antioch, six months at Eau Claire Normal College and a year at the University of Minnesota, receiving no degrees but acquiring a varied education.

At the age of twenty-three, while he was a $17.50-a-week reporter on The Minneapolis Journal, Ball married Betty Robbins, a $15-a-week morgue girl, receiving a $2.50 raise for the occasion. Soon after his marriage he sold a pulp story (he is possibly the only Senator who ever did) for $50, and was enough encouraged to quit newspaper work and retire to a cabin on the Pacific near Bellingham, Washington, where he wrote for the pulps and his wife painted. For a year he sold war, aviation and six-gun stories to the pulps, making an irregular living, but shortly before the birth of their first child he renounced the literary life as too insecure and went back to Minnesota, where he got a job with The Pioneer Press in St. Paul. By 1940, when he was appointed to the Senate, he had worked up to being a $4,500-a-year political reporter for the paper and was a powerful political voice in his state, an intimate of politicians, including Stassen, and one of the men most influential in putting Stassen into the Governor's Mansion.

Even Ball's family life is excellent for a political future. His wife, an attractive young woman, combined her activities as volunteer publicity director for the League of Women Voters with doing the family's cooking. They have three fine, photogenic children: Jennifer, thirteen, Pete, eleven and Betty, three. They live in a fairly unostentatious house in Washington across the street from the Chinese Embassy, and confine their social life almost exclusively to newspaper people.

Ball's principal orientation is still that of a newspaperman rather than a politician. He was a pioneer member of the St. Paul Newspaper Guild, but resigned when the Guild first took a political stand, arguing that it might compromise his impartiality as a political reporter. Now that he is a Senator, he is fond of referring to himself as a Reporter in the Senate, and he sends out free weekly reports to 300 Minnesota papers. The tone of these is franker than most Senators ever exhibit, and many observers believe the reports have been the single largest factor in endearing him to his constituents. Sample quotes:

After Pearl Harbor: "I don't like having that hard core of anger inside of me."

On having underestimated Japanese striking power: "I have some crow to eat and I'd like to get the unpleasant job done."

In general: "The only men in Washington who don't make mistakes are those who aren't doing anything."

Until March of this year, Ball was just a minor Republican Senator, something of a liberal, something of an eccentric, something of a political possibility for the future if he didn't talk too much. His status changed suddenly on March 14 when Senators Ball, Burton, Hatch and Hill, along with Senators Connally and Wagner, conferred at the White House with the President, Hopkins and Byrnes for an hour and a half on a new resolution the first four men had drafted. From that day on, Ball and his co-workers were big-time.

The resolution, Senate Resolution 114, provided that the United States take the initiative in calling a conference of the United Nations to discuss three specific questions: (1) temporary governments of countries freed from the Axis; (2) machinery for peaceful settlement of international disputes; (3) proposals for a military force to suppress future aggressions.

The resolution was major news for a number of reasons. It was the most concrete official proposal for United Nations cooperation yet offered; it was made by members of the Senate, which had previously displayed no great evidence of knowing that the United Nations existed; if passed, it would certainly commit the Senate, with its potent power to destroy treaties, to post-war world cooperation; and two of the four men who sponsored the resolution were Republicans, members of the accepted party of isolation.

The President's first reaction was noncommittal. Immediately after the conversation with the President, Senator Hill announced that there had been agreement on general objectives, but that the resolution would not be introduced in the Senate on the Tuesday as planned. Ball felt that the resolution should and would be introduced, and he announced that it had already been shown to twenty-five Senators, of whom "the great bulk" were "friendly." He stated the objectives of the group:

> The people think that we are on the way to winning the war, but they're not so sure that we're going to win the peace. We want to be ready with a program when the war is won. We are trying to put into words the minimum things we think will be necessary for a permanent peace.

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The resolution was introduced as planned, by Ball. Senator Connally immediately disclaimed it, in a newspaper interview, in the name of the President and the State Department. On a technicality, it was not debated.

Three days later, at a press conference, the President revealed himself more fully, announcing that he was in favor of the general outlines of the plan, but that details should be left for the Senate to decide. The resolution was enthusiastically endorsed by Willkie, by Senator Truman, who had helped to prepare it, and by Senator Thomas. Since then no action has been taken on it in the Senate, but liberal opinion throughout the nation has been markedly in its favor, waiting merely for a more definite go-ahead signal from the President to convert it into a popular issue. Ball himself has been actively stumping for the conceptions behind the measure: in the Senate, in his weekly news digest to his constituents, in speeches and radio broadcasts.

While it is too much to expect that the Ball-Burton-Hatch-Hill resolution will pass the Senate, even if defeated it will have served as a definite focusing point for public discussion of post-war United Nations policy. More important is the possibility that the resolution may foreshadow a genuine revitalization of the Republican Party, a real attempt to come to grips with the post-Harding world. Joseph Hurst Ball finds himself in the vanguard of that new movement. If it takes over the party, it may put Willkie or Stassen into the White House in 1944 or 1948. If it loses out to the forces of Dewey, Bricker, Hoover, or the other sleepwalkers, Joseph Ball will be remembered as just a young man who saw some glimmerings of the world of the future, but wasn't able to convince his own party that it was later than they thought. POTOMACUS

The End of the New Deal

THERE IS A STORY from Washington that is bigger than all the other stories about the home front. It is so big that, although often mentioned in passing, it has never been treated as a whole; and yet most of the other big and little stories depend on it. The dismissal of Leon Henderson, the attack on David Ginsburg, the argument over grade labeling, the latest series of charges by the Dies Committee (whatever they may be), the resignations from the Office of War Information (and from many other government agencies), the battles in Congress over various appropriation bills and even over the Ruml Plan: all these fit into the same pattern. Briefly, the story is that the New Deal is being abandoned, and perhaps for a long time; that the New Dealers are losing their government posts and that a new crowd is preparing to take over. It is a change somewhat slower than the one that took place in 1933, after Roosevelt's first inauguration, but it promises to be almost as sweeping.

Already it is possible to compile a long casualty list of New Deal agencies that have been killed or crippled since 1941. The Civilian Conservation Corps was the first to go; it was abolished by Congress. The Work Projects Administration was given what the President called an "honorable discharge." The Farm Security Administration will cease to exist at the end of the fiscal year, unless the agricultural-appropriations bill is rewritten by the Senate. The Home Owners' Loan Corporation was condemned to quick death by a House amendment, but the Senate wants to grant a stay of execution, so that its assets can be liquidated "in an orderly manner." The National Resources Planning Board, which the House wants to abolish overnight, may also be reprieved by the Senate, but at best it will linger on as an advisory committee without power and almost without funds. The choice is between lynching and confinement to an asylum. Even the Securities and Exchange Commission is being granted so little money that it will have a hard time protecting investors during the new era of speculation now getting under way.

The National Labor Relations Board, charged with administering the Wagner Act, has little to do at present and is uncertain about its own future. Many members of its staff are in the army or are working for the war agencies, on loan. The National Youth Administration is limited to a training program for young people about to enter war industries. The Rural Electrification Administration, with a greatly reduced budget, is being investigated by the Cannon Committee, and not in any friendly spirit. The Federal Communications Commission is being investigated by its sworn enemy, Representative Cox of Georgia. The Tennessee Valley Authority has been popular and extremely effective, but it would fall under political control if the McKellar bill was passed. The only agencies to escape being attacked are so obscure or inactive that Congress has overlooked them.

It is true that some of the work performed by New Deal agencies had become unnecessary under changed conditions. For example, with full employment there is no need for work projects—although in retrospect it seems pretty foolish to have swept out the WPA like trash from the attic, without reflecting that its experience would be useful in meeting the severe unemployment problems we are likely to face after the war. With boys of eighteen in the army, there is no present need for CCC camps. On the other hand, many of the New Deal activities are or would be far more

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useful in wartime than they were during the depression. Housing, public health, recreational facilities, maternity care, day nurseries for the children of working mothers, loans and advice for small farmers, camps for migratory workers, crop control—all these are essential parts of the manpower program or the food program, or both. Either they are being abandoned for want of appropriations, or else they are being carried out timidly and ineffectually in order to escape the attention of the hatchetmen in Congress. There is, for example, the story of the hot lunches provided for schoolchildren. Milo Perkins, now director of the Board of Economic Warfare, was largely responsible for that program, and a year ago he was jubilant because it was being copied in Brazil. Today the school-lunch program is coming to an end in thousands of American towns and cities because the government has ceased to support it.

People in Washington thought for a time that the most needed community services of the New Deal might be continued during the war by the Office of Civilian Defense, with the help of volunteer workers, and by the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services. Both offices set to work on ambitious paper programs. But OCD had to drop these activities after the congressional uproar over the "fan dancer"; and the other office, which never became famous enough to be known by its initials, has either been very discreet or almost completely inactive. Nobody regards the army or the navy as New Deal agencies, but nevertheless they are responsible for the health and morale of their men. They happen to be almost the only departments that have been carrying on a certain amount of new welfare work, including the only large-scale adult-education programs and the only government-sponsored art projects now in operation.

Most of the important wartime agencies are being run by conservatives—often conservative Republicans—or by "practical" men borrowed from business life. That is true of the Food Administration, the Rubber Administration, the Maritime Commission and the War Producton Board. At the Office of Price Administration, Prentiss Brown has been trying to keep prices down without offending anybody, with the result that nobody is satisfied and his own staff is in revolt. Many of the skilled executives whom he inherited from Leon Henderson have left or will soon be leaving. The War Manpower Commission has shown a tendency to give management more weight than labor; at least that is what friends of Deputy Chairman Harper said in explaining his resignation. The Fair Employment Practice Committee of WMC, which had been fighting racial discrimination, has lately been kept from fighting anything. The Office of War Information has been watering down its reports, so as not to offend Congress. Gardner Cowles, a newspaper publisher and a Republican, is head of its domestic branch, from which many New Dealers have been resigning. The Board of Economic Warfare, under Vice President Wallace and Milo Perkins, has more New Dealers on its staff than any other of the war agencies, but recently its policies have been timorous and conservative. Harold L. Ickes, as Fuel Administrator, seems to be following his own stubbornly courageous path—but then he never got along too badly with business men.

Most of the New Dealers yielded more easily than anyone expected. Some of those who resigned from their jobs as a protest might have stayed to fight for their principles. Others resigned from their principles instead, as a means of keeping their jobs—and usually ended by losing the jobs also. There are some pretty unpleasant stories of executives who changed their policies and dismissed their subordinates so as not to offend congressmen with a grudge. Each agency under attack was left to struggle alone; apparently the others thought that if WPA or Farm Security or the National Youth Administration was sacrificed to Congress, the others could continue their work undisturbed. It was like throwing babies to the wolves, but the pack never stopped.

It is not hard to understand why many of the New Dealers failed to act boldly. They had been trained and hired to do a job rather than to fight a political battle. After Pearl Harbor, the President seemed to lose interest in their work, and they no longer had the support of the labor unions. It was difficult for them to follow a determined policy without support from below or direction from above. They must have felt like men halfway up a cliff, when the ledge on which they are standing breaks away and the rope by which they are held is suddenly released. Some of them, like Leon Henderson in the past, and now James L. Fly and Clifford J. Durr of the Federal Communications Commission, have been putting up a brave fight without much backing. In general the brave, the timid, the able administrators and the windbags have all been sacrificed together.

I tried to compile a list of the better known New Dealers and plain liberals who resigned in protest, were forced to resign, were transferred or dismissed from the various agencies. Those who left the Office of War Information included Archibald MacLeish, Milton Eisenhower, John R. Fleming, Edgar Mowrer, Henry Pringle and almost the whole staff of the writers' division. The Department of Agriculture lost Gardner Jackson, Donald Montgomery, Mary Taylor, Herbert Parisius and Wayne Darrow. The State Department lost Paul H. Appleby, who resigned in protest against its North African policy. The Board of Economic Warfare lost Maurice Parmelee and Hartley Grattan after they were attacked last year by the Dies Committee. The War Production Board lost Robert Nathan and Sidney Hillman. The War Manpower Commission

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lost Fowler V. Harper. The Office of Price Administration lost Leon Henderson, David Ginsburg, Robert Brady, Mildred Edie, Harriett Elliott and many others. The Office of Civilian Defense lost Mayor LaGuardia and Mary Dublin, not to mention Mrs. Roosevelt, whose resignation started a whole series.

The list does not include any of the little people, and neither does it include the forty officials attacked by Representative Dies in his long speech of February 1. Among those forty are six from WPB, five from BEW and four from OPA. All are being investigated again by the Kerr Committee, which has so far reported only on six officials from the Federal Communications Commission and the Department of the Interior. Three of these were exonerated, but the committee submitted unfavorable reports on Goodwin B. Watson, William E. Dodd and Robert Morss Lovett. As a result, the House passed an amendment to the deficiency appropriation bill that prohibited the payment of their salaries—in effect, a bill of attainder.

Not all the men who resigned or were dismissed for being New Dealers have left government service. The younger ones are in the army, like David Ginsburg of OPA and Robert Nathan of WPB. Many of those over forty have found jobs near the battlefront; today these are the only government posts that many people are eager to accept. But some are glad to be sent to any corner of the world—"Just as long as it's not Washington," I heard one of them say last year before taking a boat for the Belgian Congo. Others have been hired by the old-line agencies, and it usually isn't hard for them to find a place, considering the need for trained administrators in wartime.

So far the conservatives have been fighting for the control or destruction of government agencies as a whole and—except for what Mr. Dies has been able to do on a limited scale—there has been no purge of individuals. But the new jobs taken by liberals, although they carry the same civil-service rating, are almost always farther from the center of things, less concerned with policy and more temporary than the jobs they used to hold. Others who haven't changed their posts suddenly find that their desks are empty of assignments. Some of them, who used to talk frankly, have begun to be as timid in what they say as if they were living under a dictatorship. A man close to the Dies Committee told me two years ago, "The counter-revolutionary purge hasn't yet begun."

What has happened in Washington since Pearl Harbor is the defeat of a whole class of people who went to work for the government, not in the expectation of becoming rich or powerful—though some of them learned to love power—and not in the hope of building up estates that would provide safe incomes for their children, but simply because they wanted to have fruitful careers and get things done. They hoped to be the engineers of American prosperity. Their principal economic ambition for themselves—it will never be realized—was not having to worry about bills. They are the people who are interested in ideas and are not frightened by new ones. Instead of playing bridge, they talk about America, Russia, France, England; and they read books—a student of folkways could learn a great deal by studying the sales records of the Washington bookstores for the last twenty years. As a class, they are good at making programs, fairly good as administrators, and very poor as rough-and-tumble politicians.

Their enemies are the "practical" men without much imagination who accept things as they are and ask, "What's in it for me?" And yet it would be hard to find an objective test—a measurable difference in heredity or training or income—that would provide a sure distinction between these two hostile classes. Sometimes the practical man and the intellectual, on different sides of the political struggle, were childhood friends or even brothers. A good example is the Eisenhower family, as described by Lincoln Barnett in Life:

> Since only fourteen years separated Arthur, the eldest, from Milton, the baby, the six Eisenhowers enjoyed a fraternal camaraderie that has not been dissipated by geography or divergent careers. Politically they range from right to left almost in order of age. Most reactionary is Ed, the Tacoma lawyer, who, according to Milton, "thinks the whole New Deal is terrible." Arthur, the Kansas City banker, is a "good conservative." The General—though soldiers are supposed to have no politics—has always been a middle-of-the-roader. "He's not a true liberal," says Milton, "but his thinking runs along progressive lines." Milton, who has worked for the Roosevelt administration since 1933, describes himself as a "practical liberal," and Earl—"Red Ike," the electrical engineer—as a "real left-winger."

Here are five shades of political opinion in a single family, and there might have been six if all the brothers had survived. The opinions depend more on temperament and profession than on different economic interests and yet, at the two extremes, the Eisenhowers are on different sides of the class struggle. At present the soldier is by far the most important member of the family; that is true of other families, too, and it may continue to be true for a long time after the war—although Ed, the Tacoma lawyer, may think that his day is coming. Milton Eisenhower, the mild New Dealer, has lately resigned from an important post in OWI to become the president of a Kansas college. He belongs to what is at this moment the beaten side—beaten, that is, in Washington. They will continue to fight in the country at large, where the liberals are now better organized than they used to be.

I have heard people surmising that even in Washington the fortunes of war might change. They say that Roosevelt, early in 1944, might reappoint New Dealers to office and might resume his liberal policies

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in order to carry the fall elections. But such a course might prove to be politically inadvisable, since it would merely confuse the public at large. More than that, it would be politically impossible with the present Congress in its present mood. The liberal policies wouldn't be supported by appropriations. The New Dealers would either have to resign under pressure, or else Congress would abolish their agencies.

The old struggle for power between the legislative and the executive branches of the government has never been quite so bitter. Today it is not merely a political fight but also a class war in which the questions at issue are who gets the income, who pays the taxes and who runs the show. The President, who is suspected of favoring labor and the small farmers, is being attacked through his subordinates. Against these the charge is always that they are trying to usurp the rights and powers of Congress.

"When we call up the bureaucrats," said Mr. Dies in his long speech, "what man in this House receives even ordinary courtesy? Why should they be courteous, when they feel that they are the real power in America, that they are the ones who administer the funds?" That is far from the truth of the situation, most of the bureaucrats being terrified at the mention of a congressional investigating committee, but it expresses the sense of frustration felt by congressmen when they find themselves faced with peremptory orders from their constituents that they simply can't carry out. Said Mr. Dies, "They believe that we must come crawling on our knees to them in order to get jobs for needy constituents who are constantly pressing us for employment." Said Representative Michener of Michigan, "It is time for us to go on a scalp-hunting expedition," but Mr. Dies started that expedition a long time ago. Many honest congressmen have been willing to support him, even though they dislike his methods, just as many honest business men have tolerated gangsters so long as they preyed on their competitors.

It would be hard to describe the confusion, the lowered efficiency and the plain waste of time that is caused in government agencies by investigating committees and attacks on the floor of Congress. Last year Senator Byrd was thundering against government questionnaires sent out to business men, yet at the same time his own committee was sending still longer questionnaires to government bureaus, which had to spend thousands of man hours in answering them, all wasted effort. Administrators are called from their desks to deliver the same testimony before different congressional committees; and often they are kept waiting for hours, either because the chairman is talking to a delegation of high-school pupils from his home town, or else simply to teach them a lesson in humility. For the last year, agencies have been finding it harder to hire the man they want for a given job, sometimes because the best qualified candidate once signed a letter of protest and hence would be attacked by the Dies Committee, and sometimes because, though his record is impeccably conservative, he doesn't want to get involved in political squabbles. There is still a war to fight and the agencies are supposed to do their part in fighting it; but often in Washington you wonder who it is that congressmen regard as the principal enemy: Hitler or Roosevelt or Stalin; the Nazis or the labor unions or the executive branch of their own government.

Sometimes you get a feeling of more sinister forces operating behind the scenes. Washington has always been the most innocent and villagelike of the larger capitals, but now, in the second year of a global war, it is beginning to assume a mystery-story atmosphere, with foreign uniforms, archdukes, Roman prelates, statesmen traveling incognito, Italian generals in mufti and people who look like spies from a type-casting agency. In such an atmosphere of state secrets, low confidential voices and invitations to a big red house on R Street, you have the moral certainty that plots are being woven, even if nothing ever comes of it. The people at large seem to have lost their interest in domestic politics; they have jobs and the biggest circus of all times to occupy their attention. This is a period when the professional gamblers can deal their cards from the bottom of the deck without being discovered. Sooner or later the public, that always uninvited guest, will insist on taking another hand in the game. The danger is that it may wait too long.

When a dollar-a-year man tells you late at night that maybe Hitler had the right idea—"But get me straight, we've got to lick him first"—and when an army officer says, "We'll have to kick out all those long-hairs and set up a business government. Just wait till the boys get home"—at such moments you reflect unhappily that the United States Government is a vast machine that could be used for other purposes besides national defense and furthering the common welfare. Perhaps you also reflect that the Nazis created their new German empire without making many changes in the German bureaucracy. For example, the Ministry of Justice had in 1939 exactly the same higher personnel that it had in 1932, before Hitler. Franz Neumann says in "Behemoth" that a law expelling non-Aryans and other "unreliable elements" from the civil service led to the dismissal of only 211 career officials in Prussia, and the demotion or transfer of 258. In the other states of the Reich, 1.13 percent of the higher civil servants were discharged and 2.33 percent were transferred—and with these changes the state machine belonged to the Nazis. It is possible that a fascist state could be instituted here without many changes in government personnel, and some of those changes have been made already.

MALCOLM COWLEY

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Washington Notes

What's the Matter with Congress

HERE ARE SEVEN REASONS I can think of, off-hand, for disliking this Congress. I could probably think of more if I put my mind to it. Let me set them down and then generalize from them. This is really a big problem, Congress, and I have to go about it systematically.

1. The one basic need for meeting inflation is more taxes. There are other remedies but, come hell or high water, taxation is the biggest one. Mr. Roosevelt in January asked for $16,000,000,000 of extra taxes. In five months, in the midst of desperate war, with the domestic front menaced more by inflation, rising prices, black markets, consequent wage demands and loss of morale generally, than by any other single factor, Congress hasn't even yet touched the President's basic budget recommendation. This Congress is reckless.

2. This Congress is inefficient. Most of five months it has debated the Ruml plan which, even at best, is a technique for tax collection, not a bill for new taxes. Most of this time it has been helplessly deadlocked.

3. This Congress is parochial. After more taxes, a strong, unyielding hand at the price-control throttle is the thing most needed today on the domestic wartime front. Not this Congress, but the last, undermined Leon Henderson. This Congress has continued the sabotage with its farm and other local blocs, making effective control almost impossible.

4. This Congress is improvident. When the war ends, 30,000,000 workers and soldiers, at a conservative estimate, are going to be demobilized, close together. It will be America's major unemployment threat. Advance planning will save the public millions, indeed, almost certainly, billions. Congress isn't doing the planning itself, and it proposes either to kill the National Resources Planning Board, or to make an economic Zombie out of this, the one agency that has been doing the job.

5. This Congress is ruthless. The whole world cries for food. Starving children in China are eating the bark from trees. The agency in America that has shown itself outstandingly able to increase food production, from low-bracket farmers, is the Farm Security Administration. Congress has attacked it from the start, and threatens its life. Also, Congress fights, tooth and nail, against farm subsidies to boost production.

6. This Congress—the House anyway—is lawless. In passing bills of attainder singling out Lovett, Dodd and Watson it has revived something specifically forbidden by the Founding Fathers.

7. This Congress—the House anyway—is indecent. In naming Gene Cox (D) of Georgia to try the FCC when the FCC offered evidence that Cox had received $2,500 for helping a Georgia radio station get an FCC license, the House, in effect, put a judicial wig and robe on an accused man to try his own accusers.

And yet, when I have said these things, another, larger question arises; one which I must face if I am honest. What business have I to criticize Congress at a time when democratic legislatures all over the world are under attack? Men are dying—better men than I—giving their lives in malarial jungles and among Arctic snows to safeguard this Congress, this institution, these very Gene Coxes and Ham Fishes—God help us—and above all, the tradition of free government. Where does that leave my attack?

It takes the matter back several stages and to higher ground. Personalities drop out. I must then talk about Congress, and not just this Congress. It brings up a personal conclusion I have come to after watching the legislature for some fifteen years. I do not think the caliber of men and legislation in Congress can be very much improved until the congressional system itself is improved. The trouble in Washington goes deeper than the men.

Judging by a column last week, I believe that Mr. Arthur Krock of The New York Times agrees with me in part. Mr. Henry Hazlitt, who writes New York Times editorials and is probably more conservative than Mr. Krock, agrees with me. Read his indictment of the Washington separation of powers in his book, "A New Constitution Now."

Mr. Krock was impressed, as I was, by the speech of Winston Churchill to Congress. I looked down from the press gallery on Mr. Churchill's bald head and thought, as Mr. Krock indicates he did, what tragic folly it is that we do not have a system like that of the British, which brings the President and Congress, the executive and the legislative, automatically into closer contact. This speech of Churchill's would have been, for the House of Commons, just the usual routine normal affair from the majority leader. Why, asked American observers, can't we have the same thing here? Why not end the everlasting deadlock, delay and rivalry between executive and legislative?

The answer is, of course, because of the rigidity of our governmental system. Under our separation of powers, antagonism between Congress and the executive is chronic. The basic fact in Washington under the division of powers is the absence of final responsibility. You can never fix the blame. And the delays are interminable.

Let us take the Ruml-plan debate. The House has a veto. The Senate has a veto. So does the President. Each one can deadlock the others but none has the corollary power of being able to enforce its own plan. And this happens again and again. It is true of the tax program, the action on NRPB and FSA. It is true of almost any measure you can think of.

Only a nation supremely gifted in self-government could make a system like this work for 150 years. But now it is in competition with tiger-swift dictatorships. On the answer to the question, can we have efficiency and still have Congress, may rest the future of democracy in America.

I hope I have made it plain that I don't care for this particular Congress. I think it is reactionary. But basically I think the fault lies deeper, and overwrought critics who simply let fly at Cox, Fish, Smith, Dies, *et al.*, miss the point.

Put it this way: I have an old conduit on the roof of my house. Water collects there and stagnates. I have two possible methods of procedure. I can go up periodically and sweep the thing clear, down to the drain, or I can elevate one end of the conduit and it will drain itself out every time it rains. One reform deals with the symptoms, the other with the cause.

Washington T. R. B.

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Education for War

"PRELUDE TO WAR," made by the government specifically to educate men in the armed forces, is an assembly of newsreel clips arranged to show the events, and some of the causes, leading up to the war. The army unit under Col. Frank Capra made the film so well that it is Capra's best film as well as the government's. Its exceptional quality only highlights the fact that no film like it came out when it could have done the most good: that is, before the war began, when the events it shows were happening. In 1939 Will Hays was striking out of movies any hint that Hitler was evil; until that year, and "Confessions of a Nazi Spy," the industry hadn't condemned fascism—if you got your news from movies you might not have known fascism existed.

The cause for the war, "Prelude" says, was Axis aggression and militarism. The film contrasts the freedoms we have in this country with the destruction of freedom in Italy, Germany and Japan, accents the regimentation of children and marriage to further the ends of militarism, and shows that the people of the Axis nations were the pawns and victims of small groups of men. The newsreels it uses to show its hatred of these men are familiar, but it is still worth seeing Mussolini mugging to sell a line of oratory two minutes after the line is spoken, or Hitler simpering in his own you-can't-do-this-to-me fashion. Its most surprising departure from earlier films of this type is its determined branding of all the Fascist leaders, saying "Remember these faces!" as it shows careful close-ups of everyone from Hess to Dietrich. It is interesting to note at this time (see Malcolm Cowley, page 729, this issue) that wherever the movie boasts of the brightest gains made by democracy, it shows a contribution of the New Deal—the FSA Housing project at Greenbelt; the amazing Grand Central Parkway in Queens built by the PWA; the CCC; the wages-and-hours bill being signed by Roosevelt.

It is a masterful job of clear, effortless story-telling from stray scraps of disconnected shots, which are put together to catch secondary meanings beyond mere news data. The finest part—a symphonic arrangement of dictators' armies marching—keeps enlarging, Bolero-like, on the grotesque sleep-walking quality of these armies, yet never loses sight of their concentrated power and breadth. The effortlessness of its story-telling is got by compressing incidents to their barest essentials, and then overlapping or double-exposing them. In this way it runs through its calendar of the war in a tenth of the time earlier films took, with more power and a pace adapted to the explosiveness of blitz warfare. Moreover, it captures to a poignant degree the particular tragedy of each conquered country. If the movie does not go very deeply into the reasons why whole nations of men and women would sacrifice individual liberty for the sake of being mothered by the state, the dissolute vacuity on the faces in the scene of Nazi mass marriages is one revealing shot.

Ease of thought and technique is a main ingredient of all Capra films. It is a little too easy here. The psychological and economic reasons for the rise of fascism are quickly and effortlessly glossed over. The hope of the United Nations is never wholly presented; the impression the movie leaves is that we fight for the survival of such freedoms as we have had—the right of Americans to continue voting, the right of the Chinese to their own country—but the dynamic kind of freedom we haven't had before, freedom and growth of people everywhere, doesn't emerge. Not that the interpretation of events is wrong, but that it is not carried far enough. The film makes the very human mistake of holding idyllic Greenbelt to be a not uncommon American neighborhood, which is as excusable as thinking of your Sunday best as your characteristic dress. In terms of the American people's ambitions, of the surface aspects of fascism, of recent history, its interpretations are accurate, intelligent and, above all, brilliantly translated into a visual language. As a limited but discerning mirror of civilization in the thirties the movie manages a rough, clumsy vitality, which makes the Hollywood versions of the same period seem bloodless and inconsequential.

MANNY FARBER

The Bandwagon

Company men in charge, the report added, testified they instructed the testers "to cheat, but not to cheat by more than 2,000 to 3,000 pounds."—*From the Truman Committee's report on the Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation's Irvin Works, as quoted in The Cleveland Plain Dealer.*

The litigation challenging the constitutionality of the poll-tax-repeal law [in Tennessee] was filed by Sheriff Birch E. Biggs of Polk County. Sheriff Biggs contended that the removal of the poll-tax barrier would threaten Tennessee with Republican rule.—*From The New York Times.*

Not a Minute to Lose

Nazi methods of suppression, however, have still not touched the core of opposition. It is our purpose to appraise the people's capacity to resist in each country of Europe and to determine, roughly, the amount of aid the United Nations can expect when they launch their attack upon Hitler's Fortress. But the attack must come quickly—or our conclusions will have been invalidated.—*John W. Gerber and Alfred Kantorowicz in The Nation.*

Cast Not Your Pearls

WONDERFUL MOD. 2-STY. HOME.—*Advertisement in The Pasadena Star-News.*

That All-Out Effort

Members of the organization [Michigan Spiritualists' Association] meeting [in Detroit] in a three-day convention, have pledged to contact spirits of dead soldiers only in the presence of relatives and every precaution will be taken to ensure that no Axis agents are listening.—*From The Los Angeles Daily News.*

Total-War Department

FIGHT AGAINST SIN NOW
Christians of World
Urged to Rise and
Make War on Satan

—*Head and subhead in The Los Angeles Times.*

Our readers are invited to contribute to this column; $1 will be paid for each item used. Address Bandwagon, care of The New Republic. Please enclose the original clipping.—THE EDITORS

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Correspondence

The Pope and Fascism

SIR: The respect I feel for Mr. John Haynes Holmes causes me to assume that he possesses evidence to show that "the Pope has utterly repudiated Hitler and all his works" and that "Catholic prelates in Germany and the occupied countries have vied with the Protestants in heroic denunciations of Nazi iniquity" [The New Republic, May 3]. The evidence at my disposal leads me to quite different contentions.

As far as I know, the Pope has condemned, in general terms and without mentioning names, the Nazi and Fascist ideology as well as the Communist, the liberal and any other ideology which does not stem from Catholic sources. He has deplored, always without mentioning Germany or Hitler, the attacks on Poland, Holland and Belgium, but he has consistently announced that he intends to remain "impartial" between Hitler and his victims. Nay, he has shown more than once his "partiality" in favor of Mussolini, Franco and Pétain. . . . I strongly suspect that the first man to be astonished at being credited with "repudiating Hitler and all his works" would be the Pope himself.

As for the German Catholic prelates, they have never condemned the attacks upon Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Jugoslavia or Greece. To be sure, they have now and then condemned Hitler's *religious* policies in Germany, and nothing else. But they never showed the consistency and heroism of the Protestant bishops and pastors of Norway. The only thing one may say in favor of the German Catholic prelates is that the Protestants on the whole were no better.

In Italy and in Spain the bishops do not need to concern themselves with Hitler. They need only to show their servility toward Mussolini and Franco, and they certainly do show it.

As for those of France, no more than two or three, as far as I know, have manifested their dissent from Pétain's anti-Semitic measures; the others are silent or they openly uphold Pétain's regime. . . .

Cambridge, Mass. GAETANO SALVEMINI

What Hope for the Jews?

SIR: In his article in your issue of April 26, Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein states that "Even in democratic Czecho-Slovakia its leaders in exile say that although Jews *may* be restored to political equality, they *cannot hope* for the reconstitution of their position in the economic order" (italics mine).

We would like to know what exiles say this. Such information should be substantiated. It certainly does not sound factual when we recall a statement by Jan Masaryk, Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister, who told a New York audience on June 18, 1942:

> Unless the Jewish problem is taken in hand by those who are going to shape our future as one of the major and most important ones—unless this problem is tackled and settled to the satisfaction of the Jews and decent Christians alike, unless the cancer of anti-Semitism is removed from national and international intercourse, *unless the Jews are allowed to voice their just and irretrievable rights at the very moment the negotiations for lasting peace begin—unless all this is done, we shall have lost the peace*" (italics mine).

What other single leader of a member of the United Nations ever talked this way?

When we all have such respect for the government of Czecho-Slovakia, which had the cleanest record in Europe on its treatment of all minorities, we should be particularly judicious in making such comments. A more detailed explanation is in order.

Pittsburgh, Pa. WILLIAM G. DUBIN

SIR: Since the beginning of the war Zionists have been making every effort to mobilize American sentiment in favor of converting Palestine into a Jewish state. The article of Rabbi Bernstein shows clearly that political Zionists are more interested in the conquest of Palestine from the Arabs . . . than they are in saving the Jews from Nazi persecution. . . .

Rabbi Bernstein seeks to justify the Zionist enterprise before the world's conscience by asserting that the Arabs have . . . greatly benefited by it. . . . But any benefit that reaches the Arabs is merely incidental to the Jewish development, and the Zionist policy ensures that such benefit shall be as slight as possible. A cultural and religious Zionism, based on Jewish-Arab friendship and coöperation, would have benefited both Jews and Arabs. But the political and secular Zionism of the past twenty-five years has been a force making for the exploitation of Palestine and the disintegration of the life of its people. . . . What does it profit the Arabs if Palestine becomes prosperous when an alien, uninvited and unwelcome, has by force of British arms made himself master in the Arabs' own house?

Before the advent of political Zionism during the First World War, the Arabs had always shown kindness and hospitality to the Jews. While medieval Christendom was persecuting the Jews, Arabs gave them refuge in Syria, Irak, Africa and Spain, and some of the greatest achievements of the Jewish people were made with the encouragement and under the patronage of enlightened Arab rulers. The Arabs, therefore, understand British and American sympathy for the Jews and their eagerness to do something to save some of Hitler's victims. But they are convinced that the encouragement of political Zionism would be a disservice to the Jews and a hindrance to legitimate Arab aspirations for independence and unification. A Jewish state in Palestine would perpetuate enmity and strife between two peoples who should be friends. Such a state could never be secure in the midst of sixty million hostile Arabs who have been wronged and humiliated by Zionist aggression.

The persecution of the Jews is a disgrace to civilization. The problem of relieving their distress is a world problem and any country that refuses to make the sacrifices necessary to solve it is shirking a moral responsibility. But now that half a million Jews have found refuge in Palestine, that little country, which is smaller than Vermont, has clearly done more than its share. . . .

State College, Pa. JABIR SHIBLI

SIR: I read with a great deal of interest Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein's article. I thoroughly agree with the forepart of the article, exposing the harrowing conditions of Jews in the barbarous Axis countries. But when I sought to find there a solution or even an amelioration of this pitiful situation, I find the impossible and totally inadequate answer of the Zionist press—Palestine.

Anyone familiar with Palestinian conditions knows only too well that this tiny country cannot possibly furnish the solution for post-war Jewish rehabilitation. It cannot absorb the Jews of one European country alone, still less the Jews of the world. Granted that another half-million Jews can find a refuge therein, the situation of the 14,000,000 Jews the world over still remains unsolved. . . .

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Rabbi Bernstein takes very little heed of the majority population now residing in Palestine—the Arabs. After all, they have been there for over 1,300 years and the Jewish occupancy of that country was a matter of 200 years. Granted that their progress toward modernism is not very accelerated, it is still their country, economically and religiously—don't forget the latter. To the Moslems it overshadows the former. . . .

What then is the future hope of the Jews?

Aside from the very limited number that can settle in Palestine, the victory of the Allies and humanity should bring about renewed pressure for the protection of minorities everywhere. That will include Jews.

With a League of Nations functioning and supported by all countries, including the United States—we have seen the folly of abstention—enough safeguards can be found to guarantee that a Hitler resurgence will never occur again. . . .

Philadelphia, Pa. SAMUEL EDELMAN

SIR: So fundamental a solution of the Jewish problem as is proposed by Zionism evokes a variety of reactions. For its implementation is fraught with difficulties, and they can be readily adduced as arguments against it.

But the letters published above do not come to grips with the real problem, and they contain many obvious inaccuracies. For example, "The Jewish occupancy of Palestine was a matter of 200 years." Actually, it lasted from the thirteenth century B.C. to the first century A.D., when the Romans destroyed Jerusalem. However, large Jewish communities continued to live in Palestine uninterruptedly through the subsequent centuries and there has been a steady stream of Jewish migration back to Palestine. Also, Palestine "cannot absorb the Jews of one European country alone." And yet the same writer grants "that another half-million Jews can find a refuge therein," which is equivalent to the present Jewish population of half a dozen countries, including Germany, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia. . . .

Mr. Shibli speaks of "sixty million hostile Arabs"; there are not even half that number of Arabs in the entire world. The overwhelming mass of them are illiterate, impoverished peasants dwelling in remote places and unaware even of the existence of a Jewish problem in Palestine. He says that "the Arabs have always shown kindness and hospitality to the Jews." Some of the fiercest atrocities against the Jews were perpetrated by Arabs, beginning with Mohammed himself. However, there have been long periods of friendly coöperation which do augur well for the possibility of establishing peace between the Jews and Arabs in Palestine. He writes, "The political and secular Zionism of the past twenty-five years has been a force making for the exploitation of Palestine and the disintegration of the life of its people." Even the last Royal Commission which prepared for the infamous White Paper of 1939 reported: "Up until now the Arab cultivator has benefited . . . from the presence of Jews in the country. Wages have gone up, the standard of living has improved."

I am challenged on the statement that Jews "cannot hope for the reconstitution of their position in the economic order" in Czecho-Slovakia and elsewhere. The very quotation by Mr. Masaryk which is employed to refute this is further testimony to the correctness of my thesis. It contains only the typical vague generalities but no definite promises. There is no doubt as to the good will of such liberal statesmen as Mr. Masaryk. But they are confronted with the inescapable historic fact of European anti-Semitism. Also, they know that the Jews have been so completely torn out of their former place in the economic order that no restoration of their position is possible. That is why none of these governments can make specific promises. That is why they are compelled to make compromises with anti-Semitism.

The essential points of my article are, if anything, clearer now than they were when it was written. There has been no diminution of anti-Semitism, but signs of an increase. No new havens have been found for Jews. Unhappily, I was prophetic when I asked, "Will Bermuda be different from Evian, where all the powers agreed only on one thing—not to accept Jews?"

That Palestine is the one realistic hope is confirmed by the careful investigation of Dr. Walter C. Lowdermilk, assistant chief of the Soil Conservation Service of the United States Department of Agriculture, who writes in his forthcoming book: "The Holy Land can be reclaimed from the desolation of long neglect and wastage and can be made to provide farms, industry and security for possibly five million refugees fleeing the persecutions and hatreds of Europe."

New York City PHILIP S. BERNSTEIN

From The New Republic Mail Bag

Kenneth Leslie, editor of The Protestant magazine, informs us that a petition asking for the liberation of Spanish Loyalist prisoners has been sent to President Roosevelt by 427 Protestant bishops, clergymen and religious leaders. The petition declares: "There can be no excuse for this open disregard of your command made nine days after the historic landing of American military forces in North Africa last November." It goes on to quote President Roosevelt's order requesting "the liberation of all persons in North Africa who had been imprisoned because they opposed the efforts of the Nazis to dominate the world."

H. A. Whipple of Atlanta, New York, warns the editors that Manny Farber's review of "Mission to Moscow" is a "forthright statement that he is a Communist"; Anonymous, New York City, advises in regard to the same review that "if he is patient, Manny Farber's chance to die for Mr. Trotsky will one day come." Mr. Farber says that this is what comes of having anything to do with such a mishmash as Mr. Davies' movie.

John F. Born writes to us from Bronxville, New York, commenting on George Soule's article, "Bancor or Unitas?" (May 3), which he calls "a masterly exposé of a subject of tremendous importance."

Charles Malcolmson, Assistant Director of Public Relations for the Department of Justice, calls our attention to a typographical error on page 333 of our issue of March 15. This error is not the fault of The New Republic but of a press release of the Post Office Department from which we quoted. The correct form of the sentence should have said that The Militant, Trotskyite weekly suppressed by the Post Office, was under attack because of "material deemed divisionary in character" and not "visionary."

Lewis B. Lefkowitz writes from Dallas, Texas, expressing his disagreement with the communication of Zalmon Berul, published in our April 19 issue. Mr. Lefkowitz writes: "I deplore the idea and ideal of National Zionism. I deny that a Jewish nation exists, or ever existed in anything like the accepted sense of the word. . . . It is my sincere conviction that the Nazis . . . must be rendered ineffectual, not because [they have] imperiled millions of European Jews alone, but because [they] threaten to enslave the world. . . ."

A Conference on the Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith will be held on Saturday and Sunday, May 29 and 30, at the Ethical Culture Society Auditorium. Speakers will include Max Otto, Arthur Morgan, Herbert Schneider, Eduard Lindeman, Robert Lynd and Harold Larrabee.

The Writers' Conference in the Rocky Mountains informs us that all further conferences will be suspended for the duration because of the demands of the war program on the housing facilities of the University of Colorado.

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Books in Review

Oh Shannadore

WELL, SIR, this country leaks a little at the edges, and the leaks are rivers. Noticing this, the late Constance Lindsay Skinner put in with Farrar and Rinehart to edit and publish a series of books called "Rivers of America."[1] Ruth E. Anderson took on the job of art editor. Miss Skinner's prospectus, "Rivers and American Folk," sounds cryptically polemical now, unless you remember that it must have been written during the middle thirties, when you were either one of the boys or you weren't, and if you weren't, who the hell were you—a fascist, you rat? So Miss Skinner seems to have got rather defiantly high-horsey about saying America is all right too, why not? "Before the citizen," she wrote, "who flees history books, and is justified [*sic*], agrees to exchange the American system for some other, he should at least know what he is parting with. He really has no idea: he has not met 'the folks'." In any case, she laid down the plan for "a composite study of the American Folk [in a cloud of fire?] as a nation." It was to be "literary," about people first of all, not topical or chronological; it was to be written by "artists," not "scholastics"; it was to tell "the folk saga" as the story of American rivers. Twenty-four volumes, mocked up in advance; uniform price and format, fully illustrated.

You couldn't help but say amen, amen, and warm up to the idea. But at the time I was working for something called the Federal Writers' Project, trying to help get out a business called the American Guide Series. Aside from the badgering we got, which would have made a laboratory mouse hysterical, we could have told Miss Skinner that, with the grimmest will in the world, you could wear your little brain to the bone trying to get precise organizing concepts about American culture as a whole and still not know *where* you were at sometimes. But you'd damn well better. Another thing we could have mentioned was that it might be safer not to found your plans on the idea that a Thoreau or a Twain would get up in every riverside juke joint and call "Here, brother," when you needed him for a book.

Anyhow the series got under way about 1937 with Robert P. Tristram Coffin's "The Kennebec" and has run along steadily to the latest, "The Humboldt," by Dale L. Morgan—the twenty-third volume, or the twenty-fourth, if you throw in Carl Carmer's attractive companion songbook.[2] Meanwhile Mr. Carmer and the late Stephen Vincent Benét had taken over the general editing. So now we can look along the row and see how things are shaping up. I like the books, and I've had fun reading them as they came out, but I'm bound to say I don't think they're up to much as a whole, in any demanding sense. I can't see that they amount to much more than passable-to-good local histories at the journalistic-colloquial level. Even the superior jobs—Beston's St. Lawrence, Carmer's Hudson, Canby's Brandywine, Masters' Sangamon, and a few others—might have been better if the authors had done them off the elbow.

Why? First, the format. The jacket design is good enough, though conventional, but the bold 12-point Linotype Garamond of the text ends by hitting you in the eye. Then, the pictures. The bleed reproductions of broad wash drawings in many of the books are just too much black. Some good names have contributed to the series—Aaron Bohrod, John Steuart Curry and others—but in general the professional illustrators—Pitz and Shenton and Cosgrave, for example—do a more effective and consistent job. Even so, the illustrations *in toto* make a pretty miserable roster if you compare them to such early American views as Holland's or Lacour's or the water-color panels published by Des Barres in 1777; just as most of the writing, again with exceptions, doesn't come near the persuasive liveliness of such obvious sources as Timothy Flint or Sarah Knight or the Crockett almanacs. Too much local colorism, too much quaintness, too much staying within the limits of an assigned form, or just the commercial limits. And oh God, the jocose prudery, the kind of invincible prudery that still bevels off men's underwear dummies (Why *is* that?) to get the effect of a *mons veneris*. This country has been overrun by a lot of tough cookies at one time or another, and genteelism ain't fittin', gents. Not if we have any honest interest in finding out how we were and how we are.

"Most rivers are empty cradles today," Coffin says at one point, and that's a tip-off too. The disease of forced reference runs right through these books. The authors are always trying to make the rivers *mean* more than they do (or did), trying to hook them up with everything but the kitchen stove. Another way to put it is to say that the ecological problem, the problem as to what a regional nucleus really *is*, hasn't been any too thoroughly chewed up. A short, stiff orientation in Odum's and Moore's "American Regionalism," plus a little boring in the references, might help. Again, almost any one of these books could stand a lot more critical needling of the American past. It's about time we hauled out of the weren't-we-wonderful-to-do-all-that? mood and did a little bearing down on the how-the-hell-did-we-get-into-a-jam-like-that? line of approach.

Even so, you get the admirable crispness of Henry Beston's feeling about the St. Lawrence country, and the fine dark depth of Edgar Lee Masters' brooding on the lost Canaan of the Middle West. Masters, almost alone among these writers, seems to be feeling for the real quick of the dilemma: the question, I suppose, as to whether American culture will mesh into some kind of workable homogeneity, or whether we'll go on being the separate whirling particles of the snow. VINCENT MCHUGH

[1] Rivers of America, edited by Constance Lindsay Skinner, Stephen Vincent Benét and Carl Carmer. New York: Farrar and Rinehart. 23 vols. to date; $2.50 each.

[2] America Sings, by Carl Carmer. Music by Edwin J. Stringham. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 243 pages. $3.

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England on a Sticky Wicket

Decline and Fall, by Evelyn Waugh. New Edition. With illustrations by the author. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 293 pages. $2.50.

AFTER FOURTEEN YEARS "Decline and Fall" remains a very funny book; no one else has been quite so witty and wise about English school and university life, county families, Mayfair, "this whole code of ready-made honor that is the still small voice, trained to command, of the Englishman all the world over." It is good once more to accompany Paul Pennyfeather from the time he is sent down from Oxford on a false charge to his return to the university to take orders. In the meantime he has taught school in Wales, resided ambiguously with the beautiful Margot Beste-Chetwynde, been arrested (again on a false charge) and imprisoned on the morning he was to marry her ("anyone who has been to an English public school will always feel comparatively at home in prison"). Best of all he has met the immortal Captain Grimes, bounder and gentleman, and Philbrick, a character of many names and devices, who appears first as a butler and ultimately as "Arnold Bennett."

If the smartness of "Decline and Fall" is only smartness and not the wisdom that many named it, and its stray tenderness ("Things haven't turned out quite as we expected them to, have they?" Margot asks Paul after she has betrayed him) merely the sentimentality that is the reverse of the Janus-medallion of the tough writer, it is still a brilliant footnote to British history between two wars. I doubt, however, if it will be taken again with quite the seriousness that John Strachey gave to it in "The Coming Struggle for Power," where he discusses Waugh with Joyce and Proust as the chronicler of a doomed civilization. But if, as Malcolm Cowley said in these pages last week, Graham Greene's adventure stories "may come to occupy a pretty important place in the history of English letters," perhaps Evelyn Waugh's "Decline and Fall" and his "Vile Bodies" may have an equally respectful, equally minor (a minor writer is often an important writer), place in the canon.

It would be pat to say that Greene illuminates the psychotic violence of the post-depression, post-Hitler years, while Waugh refracts the neurotic silliness of the twenties, but this would overlook a similar preoccupation with insanity and death that accompanies the laughter of Waugh's novels. On the first page of "Decline and Fall" we read of an Oxford club dinner at which "a fox had been brought in in a cage and stoned to death with champagne bottles," and in the closing pages of "Vile Bodies," written in 1930 but "laid in the near future," the hero carries his "Huxdane-Halley bomb" on "the biggest battlefield in the history of the world."

Hilary St. George Saunders, whose official documentaries, including "The Battle of Britain," have sold more than twelve million copies since 1941 and whose "Combined Operations" is a June selection of the Book-of-the-Month Club, is now in this country at the invitation of Elmer Davis. At a time when Saunders was collaborating on the Francis Beeding thrillers—second-rate Oppenheim plus Bolshevist bogey ("The House of Dr. Edwardes") and sympathy for Italian fascism ("The Black Arrows"), Greene and Waugh were presciently exploring the actual arena of reversal and terror with much of the cogent brilliance of their countrymen, Auden and Isherwood. Their books lie open like wounds that fester, the letters maggots of irony, pity and hatred. If Mr. Saunders and his host want a good steady look at some of the things that prefigured the Battle of Britain, we recommend "Decline and Fall."

GEORGE MAYBERRY

Voltaire Was Right

The Enigma of Admiral Darlan, by Alec de Montmorency. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. 194 pages. $2.50.

WE USED TO DISCUSS IT IN FRANCE—the enigma, I mean. To be sure, most of my French friends, being liberals or socialists, hardly recognized any enigma at all. For them it was all summed up in the one word "traitor." But at Vichy, in Toulon, among naval officers, in the houses of the aristocracy, and here and there a bit everywhere, there were people who regarded him as a patriot sacrificing himself for his country. And when he made a violently anti-English speech, when he ordered French convoy vessels to fire on British naval vessels, when he said that the Germans were kinder than the English, these people always explained that he was really only pulling the wool over the eyes of the Boches. The fact that a good deal of wool also got pulled over the eyes of a great many French did not seem to disturb them at all.

Alec de Montmorency is one of these—not perhaps one whose eyes are covered with a thick thatch of *laine Darlan, marque déposée,* but one who admires and defends the late Admiral of the Fleet and seeks to explain away everything about him which goes counter to the concept of the hero-patriot. Neither the author nor the publisher tells us so, but we may conclude from the internal evidence of the book that de Montmorency is himself a naval officer or a civil employee of the French navy department, for he says he first met Darlan "in the early nineteen-twenties" at the naval academy at Cannes, where he was a student and the Admiral had come to visit his son, also a student. And he last saw him at Bordeaux, in July, 1940, when he had an office next to Darlan's in the temporary quarters of the Ministry of the Marine. His book is exactly what we might expect from such an author; in fact it is amazing how true to type these people are: Royalist, anti-Republican, pro-Franco, anti-German, pro-Pétain, anti-British, pro-navy, anti-army and, above all, pro-Darlan and anti-de Gaulle.

It is Mr. de Montmorency's thesis that Admiral Darlan was always a patriot, and always right. In fact, one gathers from his account of him that the Admiral was incapable of doing wrong or even of making a serious mistake. According to de Montmorency, he did more for the French navy than anyone since the Bailli de Suffren, making of it in a few short years a superb instrument of war, superior even to the British navy. And to Mr. de Montmorency the fact that Darlan also greatly strengthened the Royalist elements in the navy is of course only one more feather in his cap. Others might argue that so long as

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France was a republic, this deliberate policy of advancing only anti-Republican officers amounted to something approaching treason. But not de Montmorency: to him the Royalists are "born sailors" and therefore, obviously, the best officers. More, he even tells approvingly of an alleged plot, supposed to have been hatched in 1936, to overthrow the Republic and replace it with a military dictatorship, a plot in which Pétain, Weygand and Darlan were all involved, and in which Darlan's role was to assemble all the Republican officers on the old Jean Bart and then sink it with a torpedo. But someone talked, and the plot had to be abandoned—to de Montmorency's obvious chagrin.

But if Darlan was anti-Republican, he was by no means pro-German, and if he was willing to employ murder to finish with the Republic, he was equally willing to employ the same method to outwit the German conqueror. For it was he who arranged to have the pilot carrying General Huntziger back from Africa wreck his plane on the way, killing himself, of course, but also disposing of the General, who was too friendly to the Germans to please the Admiral of the Fleet.

If Darlan yielded Indo-China to the Japanese, it was because it was hopeless to resist them and he did not want to spill French blood in vain attempts. If he defended Syria against the English and the Fighting French, it was because France had given Germany her word of honor to defend the French empire. And if he resisted the Americans in North Africa, it was because he wanted to avoid the ignominy of submitting to occupation by a foreign power. By resisting, he was able to perpetuate French rule and preserve his own.

Whatever he did was always right, always in the best interests of his country and, by a happy coincidence, also in his own.

It is a strange thesis, dangerously oversimple, disturbingly biased and curiously blind to moral values. And it is buttressed by assertions whose worth is often doubtful and sometimes clearly nil. Thus César Campinchi, the last Republican Minister of the Navy, is described as a defendant in the Riom trials, though he died before the trials began and was never even indicted in them. Léon Blum is said to have "cut and slashed" into the credits of the army and the air force, though actually Blum more than doubled the war appropriations as soon as he came to office, and raised a new 10,000,000,000-franc loan for the air force in addition. It was Marshal Pétain who, as Minister of War in an earlier Cabinet, had "cut and slashed."

General de Gaulle will be amazed to learn that the "ability of the Free French . . . to tune in faithfully to whatever theory" is "most agreeable to the British . . . is, in a great measure, responsible for their popularity with the Allies"! In general, de Montmorency's book has the qualities which the French call "mythomania."

It would, I think, be possible to make out some sort of case for Admiral Darlan. At least it would be possible to argue that his collaboration with the Germans has been over-harshly judged, both in France and abroad. Despite the violence of his anti-British feelings, he was not, I believe, consciously trying to help Hitler to victory, and I suspect that we may some day have to revise our opinion of him a little, taking into account rather more than we are now inclined to the relentless pressure of the Germans and the terrible alternatives a man in Darlan's position inevitably faces once he has embarked on the fateful road of collaboration with the enemy.

But I do not think that we shall ever see a hero in him, and it is doubtful whether the historians of the future will ever be able to make him into a martyred patriot. Certainly Mr. de Montmorency has not done so. On the contrary, his book only serves to emphasize the man's overweaning ambition and the deep vein of authoritarianism in him. As for the majority of Darlan's fellow countrymen, whatever the historians say, they are likely to conclude that the Admiral was the crafty, scheming, self-seeking egoist they have already put him down for, and, remembering it, to echo approvingly the answer Candide got to his question about another admiral: *"Cela est incontestable, mais dans ce pays-ci il est bon de tuer de temps en temps un amiral pour encourager les autres."*

VARIAN FRY

Men and Nations

National Consciousness, by Walter Sulzbach. Introduction by Hans Kohn. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Public Affairs. 168 pages. $3.

NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS is by far the most important force in modern times. Religion does not influence men so profoundly; and in times of stress even class solidarity has yielded to nationalism." Sulzbach deplores this situation but believes man can emancipate himself from the tyranny of nationalism. In his opinion, nationality is not an objective condition but a "social *a priori*," underlying much contemporary thought, policy and action. "It may be," he writes, "that our social *a priori* can be changed and that we will then feel indifferent toward problems now considered of the utmost importance."

Sulzbach, however, attaches some reservations to this subjective view of nationalism. Both "coincidence" and "necessity," he believes, must be considered in defining it. The individual, it is true, does not acquire national consciousness from instinct, but from parents, teachers, newspapers, books and propaganda, as Professor Merriam has so well pointed out in his series of studies on civic education. Nationalism from the point of view of the individual is not inevitable but is man-made and man-communicated and might be man-destroyed. The nation, on the other hand, viewed historically, appears to be inevitable, and the national consciousness of its members appears to be a necessity. From one point of view nationalism is "artificial"; from the other it is "natural."

The author undoubtedly prefers the former point of view, so much so that he occasionally forgets the latter. "It was not so, as we are prone to think, that the states grew out of the nations; it was the nations which owe their origins to the states." He examines in detail the nation-building policies and methods of rulers and writers since the Renaissance with such suggestive remarks as—"The French nation owes its existence to the Capetians"; "By helping German Protestantism at a critical time, Luther became an important factor in German national history"; "'The Divine Comedy' created a nation"; "A historical falsifica-

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tion, the Koeniginhofer manuscript, first exposed as spurious by the late President Masaryk when he was a young professor, has done much to build up the national consciousness of the Czechs"; and "The Arab national movement began in Syria in 1847 as a result of the foundation in Beyrouth of a modern literary society under American patronage."

Sulzbach, however, is not content to prove that men have made nationalities. He also discusses the insufficiency of the supposed natural criteria for distinguishing one nationality from another. After examining at length the supposed roles of race, of national character, of language, of geography, of tradition and of common interests in defining the nation, he concludes that anthropological, psychological, geographical and even historical considerations do not adequately account for nationality.

How then can the nation be explained? Sulzbach apparently endorses the suggestion by Huxley and Hadden that "A nation is a society united by a common error as to its origin and a common aversion to its neighbors." More formally, he defines a nation as "A group of people which wishes to be sovereign among other people and therefore desires a state of its own." There is contradiction in this definition but it is the fault of the concept rather than of the author. The group wishes to be sovereign, free, self-sufficient, alone, yet it also wishes to be among other peoples with the same prerogatives.

The sociologist's conception of in-group and out-group, each defining the other, therefore, explains the nation. Any collection of persons may be considered by its members as an in-group. Once this is done all others are out-groups. The in-group begins to assume a character from the description of its differences from out-groups as observed or invented by some of its members or by others.

The "natural" element in the nation is not therefore to be found in its characteristics but in the propensity of human beings to group themselves and to oppose other groups. Men have a social instinct and a fighting instinct, and can express both by identifying themselves with a fighting group. Nationalism is therefore closely related to imperialism. "Patriotism, conventionally defined as love of country, now turns out rather obviously to stand for love of more country." In recent times the nation, larger than the tribe, clan or village but smaller than the empire, continent or civilization, happens to have been the instrument for serving these instincts.

It is clear that if nationalism rests upon a social *a priori* believed in, not because of any objective possibility of verification but because it serves a psychological need, it is closely related to religion. The religion of nationalism in fact filled the void left by declining faith in Christianity. Man, however, is rational to a certain degree. The individual and the human race are the only entirely objective groupings of human materials. Thus nationalists, like class-conscious socialists, cannot avoid the effort to justify their creed by the claim that its realization will benefit the individual and mankind. In the liberal nationalism of Mazzini and Mill this tendency was especially evident. The principle of nationality, it was thought, would divide the world into groups under governments which could best serve the individual members of each and which together would provide the variety in which civilization could peacefully progress. The theory overlooked the tendency of nationalism, once it had become the dominant social *a priori*, to gather to itself all the forces of legal sovereignty, economic exclusiveness and military rivalry. The world order continued as a military balance of power in which the attitudes of the nations toward one another were less and less qualified by considerations of law, morality and economic expediency.

In looking toward the future the author examines trends and policies. He thinks the trend is favorable to peace, and that the tendencies toward increased nationalism, caused by present dictatorships, will become more moderate.

In regard to policy the author points out the dangers, in a world in which security depends primarily on self-help, of attempting to draw boundaries in accord with any supposed criteria of nationality. He suggests, instead, that extreme nationalism must be discredited and its excesses ridiculed to break its alliance with traditional militarism before the nations can live in peace.

Sulzbach's analysis of nationalism appears to be sound. He perhaps overemphasizes the evils of nationalism—it has served a useful purpose in moderating the violence of tribal, class and local loyalties. The influence of the book in shaping opinion on problems of the peace after the present war will, however, be salutary.

The idea that national self-determination should be the central motive in peace-making has been attacked in recent years, notably by Guglielmo Ferrero and Erich Hula, as it was in the past by such men as Lord Acton and Carlton Hayes. This idea figures less in the utterances of statesmen today than it did after the First World War, although it should be emphasized that even on that occasion statesmen embraced national self-determination reluctantly and as a measure of war expediency. The Atlantic Charter emphasizes historical right and the avoidance of territorial changes. "The right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live" does not necessarily imply self-determination of national boundaries. Democracy, consent of the governed and self-determination have no necessary connection with nationality, nationalism and national self-determination.

Sulzbach perhaps overemphasizes the subjective aspects of nationalism. The creative force of the idea of nationalism when buttressed by law, administration, education and propaganda has tended to develop objective differences between nations which social inertia preserves. Sulzbach recognizes this when he writes, "Of the two competing religions [nationalism and Marxian socialism], nationalism has been the more successful. The chief reason for this is that nations really exist, whereas the international revolutionary proletariat is a fiction." His emphasis is, however, right. Nationality has outgrown its usefulness as the prime basis of political organization. With modern totalitarian war, nationalism, while it may satisfy the human impulses of sociability and dominance, frustrates other equally important impulses and desires, and presents serious obstacles to economic and social progress. As a cultural concept nationality may have a continuing value, but the opinion which has sought to identify the state, the economy and the army with the nation and then to treat the nation as an absolute value, has proved a blind alley. A world order relying on a military equilibrium between such absolutes can no longer be either stable, prosperous or free. Men must realize that

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stability in a complex and interdependent world requires a greater complexity of human loyalties. The laziness of men induces them to unify their loyalties upon a dominant symbol, but the price is too great. Men in the modern world must resign themselves to the task of dividing their loyalties among numerous institutions and concentric areas of authority, reconciling the claims of each, not on the battlefield, but in the reflective intelligence of the free personality.

QUINCY WRIGHT

The Promised Land

The White Face, by Carl Ruthven Offord. New York: Robert M. McBride and Company. 317 pages. $2.75.

FOR NEARLY A QUARTER OF A CENTURY, Harlem has been widely publicized as the world's most populous Negro community. At times it has been glamorized as a vast night club with gay and bizarre entertainment provided by the dancing feet and singing hearts of its carefree citizens. Often it has been smeared as an iniquitous dive wherein muggers and other anti-social creatures are spawned. Occasionally, it has been hailed as the promised land for aspiring black folk. Seldom, however, has it been depicted as an American community differing from other American communities chiefly because of the restricted opportunities afforded its people for economic security, social welfare and cultural advancement.

In this first novel by a young Negro author, the attempt is made to portray the warping influence of these limitations upon the lives of Chris and Nella Wood, refugees from a Georgia peonage farm. Making their way to Harlem, the couple expect to gain freedom and security. They find the Negro community mired deep in the depression with security for none, and soon learn that such freedom as Harlem enjoys is not enough. Sought by the police of Georgia on a false charge of murder, Chris lives in terror, not daring to go abroad before nightfall. The responsibility for earning a livelihood falls to his wife, Nella, who, by the way of the "Slave Market," finds employment as a day worker in the Bronx. The resentment which Chris harbors against his white oppressors, nurtured by fear and insecurity, is fanned into flaming hate by the exhortations of a notorious soapboxer. Behind the scenes, sinister, fascist-minded figures, Negro and white, manipulate the soapboxer and his following with a view to spreading anti-Semitism and creating disunity. Blinded by his hate of white folk, Chris becomes embroiled in this lunatic movement from which Nella vainly attempts to save him. Fear and frustration drive him inevitably to his tragic fate.

It is a sordid story that Mr. Offord relates—one of abject poverty, petty racketeering and wanton violence—a dreary story of the social and political underworld of Harlem in conflict with progressive elements in the community which, by comparison, seem puny and ineffective.

"The White Face" endeavors to depict this conflict and to dramatize the impact of urbanization upon a rural Southern Negro couple. But somehow the novel doesn't quite come off. The situations seem strained and the characters unreal. Chris and his underworld associates all bluster in the unconvincing manner of actors overplaying their parts. As unlovable as Bigger Thomas, and motivated by similar fears, Chris lacks the human and dynamic qualities which make the protagonist of Richard Wright's "Native Son" a memorable character.

Color there is aplenty in Harlem. And joy and pathos, beauty and ugliness, triumph and defeat, indifference and revolt, hope and frustration. Yet out of this melange, there has come no novel of enduring quality, no story which has probed deep into the social and economic conditions and given a representative picture of the community—nothing to compare in vividness, scope and understanding with James T. Farrell's portrayal of Irish-American life in his "Studs Lonigan" trilogy. Mr. Offord has not succeeded, naturally, where more experienced and talented writers have failed.

HENRY LEE MOON

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A Reader's List

PLANNING: FACTS ABOUT ELECTRICITY SUPPLY (Political and Economic Planning, Number 204. Available from The New Republic, 25 cents). This concise booklet provides a summary of data relevant to the generation and consumption of electricity in Great Britain. It presents information on war and pre-war consumption of electricity, rates, labor and wages, and the effect of war on the British electrical-supply industry. Of interest to readers in this country in so far as it deals with the problem of labor shortages and the employment of women.

LABOR IN AUSTRALIA, by Lloyd Ross (American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 5 cents). The author is State Secretary of the New South Wales Branch of the Australian Railways Union. He subtitles the booklet, "the story of a successful labor movement," which indeed seems justified. In a population of 7,000,000, Australia has 1,000,000 trade unionists. "There is no body of workers, no large factory, no industry in which the unions do not control relations between employees and employer. The unions dominate the Labor Party, which today controls the government of Australia." The outstanding difference between Australian and American unionism, the author points out, is that the former has achieved most of its gains by political action. The booklet is a full nickel's worth of profitable reading for American unionists.

CONSUMERS IN WARTIME, by Leland J. Gordon (Harpers, $1.75). This book is a useful source of information on consumer problems in wartime. Opening with a simple explanation of the economics of present restrictions on consumer choice, the author proceeds with an enlightening analysis of wise consumer spending on such items as food, clothing and shelter. His constructive argument is well reinforced with discussion of unwise spending. On almost every page are lists of books and articles which contain additional information compiled by government experts and consumers' organizations.

TREES AND TEST TUBES: THE STORY OF RUBBER, by Charles Morrow Wilson (Holt, $3.50). A discussion of our greatest "have-not" resource, from the pre-Columbian Mayas to the Baruch Committee. A tropical agriculturist, Wilson believes that the rubber tree (*Hevea brasiliensis*) is our best long-range source, but he hopes to see the vicious and unsound British-Dutch Far Eastern cartel replaced by small-farm production in Latin America. He makes it clear, though, that our immediate needs must be supplied by the synthetics program. Although written too soon to cover recent Washington conflicts (the name Jeffers does not appear), the book constitutes a valuable and thorough analysis of rubber's crisis at its worst—six months after Pearl Harbor. The full text of the Baruch report is appended.

LIBERTY THROUGH POWER, by Eduard Heimann (Union for Democratic Action, 10 cents). This is the first of a series of pamphlets to be published by the UDA as guides to post-war reconstruction. Liberty, Professor Heimann maintains, cannot be achieved through the abolition of power or sovereignty. Peace and democracy can be assured only by force or the threat of force. It is therefore necessary for democratic nations and peoples to understand and acquire power, so that by collective action they may create the necessary conditions for a democratic post-war world.

THE WRIGHT BROTHERS, by Fred C. Kelly (Harcourt, $3.50). Authorization by Orville Wright makes this account the standard biography; by skillful writing and detailed research, Fred Kelly has made it an engrossing study in the sociology of invention. The accumulation of little improvements, basic to the inventive process, is made as exciting as the dramatic and dignified know-how of the Wright brothers. These technological and personal factors are neatly blended with the movement from public and press incredulity to the world adulation of these Americans who made the grade by solid work and technical curiosity.

THE WIND THAT SWEPT MEXICO, by Anita Brenner and George R. Leighton (Harpers, $3.75). A brief narrative and 184 photographs which relate the history of the Mexican revolution from the overthrow of Díaz to the present. Miss Brenner's text reveals a close knowledge and a sharp understanding of the personalities, events and issues of Mexican history. The bias, when apparent, is leftist but strongly anti-Communist. The photographs chosen by Mr. Leighton brilliantly illuminate the text, and he has added an excellent note on the men who made them.

FOREVER YOUNG, by Blanche Colton Williams (Putnam's, $3.50). Neither a critical study nor a candied eulogy, this narrative recreates the last years of Keats's life primarily from his letters. Here is not the defenseless martyr of "Adonais," but a witty and confident young artist, suffering far more in his need for money, his bad health and tortured love for Fanny Brawne, than at the hands of the critics. Because it is unpretentious and free of sentimentality, Dr. Williams' portrait of Keats as an outrageous punster, a good fellow *and* a great poet, is engaging and fresh.

PASSPORT TO TREASON: THE INSIDE STORY OF SPIES IN AMERICA, by Alan Hynd (McBride, $3). Although Hynd's story is familiar in general outline, he has integrated scattered newspaper coverage and filled in the exciting details of the FBI's major spy round-ups. He describes the combination of FBI thoroughness and shrewd guesswork that led to the capture of the eight saboteurs who landed from submarines on Long Island and Florida, and relates the amazing circumstances surrounding William Sebold, the FBI counter-spy who for more than a year posed as a Gestapo agent and short-waved false information to Germany. His facts (and style) are strongly reminiscent of pulp fiction. But despite sabotage academies and invisible inks, espionage has lost much of its glamor; Mata Hari's heirs are beer-guzzling Bundists, ex-waiters and Brooklyn housewives.

Contributors

POTOMACUS is a pseudonym that will be used on articles about Washington personalities and events, when for various reasons it is inexpedient to reveal the name of the author.

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